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Insurance law and tort law are fraternal twins.  Though 
not identical, they reflect one another.  They may even finish 
one another’s sentences. 
Regardless of the bells and whistles on an automobile, 
there will be accidents.  So long as automobiles have drivers 
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responsible for controlling the wheel, the insurance scheme 
may look much as it does at present.  When the bells and 
whistles do not sound as they should, however, an increasing 
amount of liability for injuries is likely to bypass drivers and 
alight on the sellers and manufacturers of the vehicle.1 
Apart from other social benefits, there is every reason to 
assume that autonomous vehicles (AVs) will be safer than 
current automobiles.  Among other features, they will enjoy a 
360-degree field of vision, they will have a faster reaction 
time, and they will not fall asleep.2  Assuming they are safer, 
in an efficient market the overall cost of insuring AVs should 
decrease.  To the extent the insurance burden is ultimately 
shouldered by those other than the driver,3 it will be added to 
the cost of the car.  Although lower, the owner will still bear 
the cost of the premium.4  The lower direct and indirect 
insurance cost should, therefore, benefit consumers.  It also 
should be more efficient for the manufacturer to purchase one 
policy covering 10,000 automobiles than for drivers to 
purchase 10,000 policies, each covering only one automobile. 
If we contemplate the futuristic world of the totally 
autonomous vehicle—one in which the driver is simply a 
passenger free to read, text,5 or even sleep—the dynamics of 
 
 *  Robert W. Peterson is a Professor of Law at Santa Clara University and 
Director for the School of Law’s Center for Insurance Law and Regulation.  The 
author is very grateful to law student and research assistant, Nicole Hess, for 
her assistance with this Article. 
 1. See Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417 (1978); Soule v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 559 (1994). 
 2. See HANS-JOACHIM WUENSCHE ET AL., RESARCH FOR THE INSTITUTE FOR 
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, available at 
http://www.elrob.org/fileadmin/catalogue/9.pdf. 
 3. Although the car may “drive” itself, this Article will use “driver” as 
shorthand for driver/owner/operator/passenger in charge. 
 4. Since auto insurance is mandatory in California, the premium is a cost 
of owning a car.  See CAL. VEH. CODE § 16020 (West 2007).  Although products 
liability insurance is not mandatory, manufacturers and suppliers will also pass 
their insurance costs through to purchasers. 
 5. Nevada recently amended its vehicle code to permit texting while in a 
self-driving vehicle.  Senate Bill 104 amended Nevada Revised Statutes section 
484B.165 to read: 
For the purposes of this section [prohibiting texting and mobile phone 
use while operating a motor vehicle], a person shall be deemed not to 
be operating a motor vehicle if the motor vehicle is driven 
autonomously through the use of artificial-intelligence software and 
the autonomous operation of the motor vehicle is authorized by law. 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165. 
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insuring a car may change considerably.6  If a driver is merely 
a passenger, and if the driver’s responsibility is to remain 
fault-based, then what purpose would a typical automobile 
liability policy serve?7  What relevance remains for auto 
insurance?  This Article will address this issue and propose 
ways in which auto insurance might change to accommodate 
the use of AVs.  Part I briefly reviews the background of 
insurance regulation nationally and in California.  Part II 
discusses general insurance and liability issues related to 
AVs.  Part III discusses some challenges that insurers and 
regulators may face when setting rates for AVs, both 
generally and under California’s more idiosyncratic 
regulatory structure.  Part IV discusses challenges faced by 
California insurers who may want to reduce rates in a timely 
way when technological improvements rapidly reduce risk. 
I. CURRENT INSURANCE REGULATION 
In 1945 Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act.8  
This Act largely ceded regulation of insurance to the states.9  
With rare exception, regulation of insurance has remained in 
the states.10  The year following the enactment of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) surveyed existing state 
laws and proposed its model rating bills.11  These included the 
 
 6. Popular culture has imagined autonomous cars for years, from Woody 
Allen’s 1973 movie “Sleeper,” to Stephen King’s 1986 movie “Maximum 
Overdrive,” where cars come to life and reign terror over a small town, to the 
popular animated children’s movies Cars and Cars 2.  SLEEPER (Universal 
Artist 1973); MAXIMUM OVERDRIVE (De Laurentiis Entertainment Group 1986); 
CARS (Walt Disney Pictures 2006); CARS 2 (Walt Disney Pictures 2011). 
 7. Celent, a research group, published a study suggesting the possible 
demise of liability insurance.  Donald Light, A Scenario: The End of Auto 
Insurance, CELENT (May 8, 2012), http://www.celent.com/reports/scenario-end-
auto-insurance (includes an Abstract and projected time line).       
Of course, there will still be a need for collision, comprehensive, medical 
pay, and perhaps underinsured motorist—although recovery under 
underinsured motorist coverage requires proof of liability on the part of the 
underinsured motorist.  See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 2006). 
 8. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2011). 
 9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012. 
 10. ERISA and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act are 
exceptions.  See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47–49 (1987). 
 11. Michael J. Miller, Disparate Impact and Unfair Discriminatory 
Insurance Rates, CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SOC’Y E-FORUM, Winter 2009, at 276, 
279, http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/09wforum/miller.pdf. 
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provisions, now virtually standard in all states, that rates not 
be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.12  Rates 
could be modified for individual risks only if based on 
“variations in hazards or expense provision, or both.”13  
California adopted the restriction on unfairly discriminatory 
rates in the 1947 McBride-Grunsky Act, and the restriction 
that rates may not be “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly 
discriminatory” was carried forward into Proposition 103.14 
Virtually all insurance regulators include an assurance 
within their brief that insurance companies remain solvent 
and pay their claims.  This is reflected by the word 
“inadequate” in the phrase “excessive, inadequate or unfairly 
discriminatory.”15  A second goal, consumer protection, will be 
reflected in statutes and regulations directed at, for example, 
claims and marketing practices.  Depending on how market 
oriented the state may be, consumer protection is also 
reflected by the fact that states regulate rates with the 
purpose to keep them as low as practical.  States differ 
greatly with respect to their approach to accomplishing this 
latter goal.16 
Focusing on automobile insurance, most states divide 
into three broad categories of regulation: prior approval, file-
and-use, and use-and-file.  File-and-use or use-and-file states 
rely primarily on competition to determine insurance rates.17  
Insurers may simply file their rates with their Insurance 
Commissioner and use them (sometimes after a fairly short 
waiting period), or use them immediately as long as they file 
the rates within a specified period of time.18  Although 
commissioners in these states have broad oversight and can 
disapprove a rate based on inadequacy, excessiveness, or 
unfair discrimination, they tend primarily to rely on the 
 
 12. Id. at 280. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1445 (Ct. App. 
2010); CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West 2011). 
 15. Id. § 1861.05(a). 
 16. See Vanessa Wells, Ships Passing in the Night: How California’s 
Statutory Framework Directs Traffic Through the Maze of Jurisdictional 
Doctrines Concerning Insurance Rates, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 853 (2010). 
 17. J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, STATE 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE REGULATION: A NATIONAL QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND 
IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S UNIQUELY EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SYSTEM 
2–3 (2008), available at http://www.consumerfed.org. 
 18. Id. 
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marketplace to regulate rates.19 
There is a substantial amount of data about automobile 
loss experiences on which insurers and regulators base their 
rates.  All automobile owners are familiar with the practice of 
adjusting auto rates up or down based on various factors 
relevant to risk.  Common factors relevant to risk include 
driving record, miles driven, years licensed, education, 
marital status, gender, location, type of car, years of coverage 
by the company, academics, number of cars and drivers, etc.20 
When working within the context of a file-and-use or use-
and-file environment, AVs will present only modest 
challenges to an insurer that wants to write these policies.  
The main challenge will arise from the fact that the policy 
must be rated for a new technology that may have an 
inadequate base of experience for an actuary to estimate 
future losses.21 
“Prior approval” states, like California, require that 
automobile rates be approved prior to their use in the 
marketplace.22  These states rely more on regulation than on 
competition to modulate insurance rates.23  In California, 
automobile insurance rates are approved in a two-step 
process.  The first step is the creation of a “rate plan.”24  The 
rate plan considers the insurer’s entire book of business in 
the relative line of insurance and asks the question: How 
much total premium must the insurer collect in order to cover 
the projected risks, overhead and permitted profit for that 
line?25  The insurer then creates a “class plan.”  The class 
plan asks the question: How should different policyholders’ 
premiums be adjusted up or down based on the risks 
presented by different groups or classes of policyholders?26  
 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 
1187 (Ct. App. 2000); HUNTER, supra note 17, at 36–39. 
 21. See Rodney Griffin, New Technologies Rapidly Changing Auto Insurance 
Business, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360° (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/02/10/new-technologies-rapidly-
changing-auto-insurance-b. 
 22. Wells, supra note 16, at 853. 
 23. See HUNTER, supra note 17. 
 24. See MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1431 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
 25. See id. at 1436. 
 26. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 
1201 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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Among other factors, the Department of Insurance requires 
that the rating factors comply with California law and be 
justified by the loss experience for the group.27 
Rating a new technology with an unproven track record 
may include a considerable amount of guesswork.  Of course, 
those marketing AVs will have subjected the vehicles to 
rigorous testing in an environment, one may assume, 
congruent with those the auto is likely to encounter.  These 
test results, if shared with insurance companies, would give 
some basis for rating the automobile.  Nevertheless, insurers 
may over or underestimate the frequency and severity of 
future accidents.  The rate may be excessive, or it may be 
inadequate.  Since one might expect that there will be few 
AVs initially, an inadequate rate may not implicate serious 
solvency issues for an insurer that has a large book of 
traditional automobile insurance.  A rate that turns out to be 
excessive may be “unfairly discriminatory,” but the 
practicalities of making a more accurate estimate based on 
little or no experience would likely prove a defense to any 
discrimination claim. 
A. Some Insurance Issues Unique to California 
California is the largest insurance market in the United 
States, and it is the sixth largest among the countries of the 
world.28  Cars are culture in this most populous state.  There 
are far more insured automobiles in California than any other 
state.29  The California Department of Insurance employs 
between 1200 and 1300 employees, including over eighty 




 27. See id. at 1201–04. 
 28. Analysis of 2006–07 Budget Bill, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2006/general_govt/gen_05_0845_anl06.html (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
 29. Auto Insurance, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.iii.org/ 
media/facts/statsbyissue/auto/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
 30. Center for Insurance Law and Regulation, SANTA CLARA LAW, 
http://law.scu.edu/insurancelaw/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
 31. Marc Lifsher, California Insurance Commissioner to Gain More Power 
from Federal Healthcare Law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/14/business/la-fi-insurance-commissioner-
20101014. 
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Automobile insurance in California is governed by 
Proposition 103, adopted by the voters in 1988.32  Proposition 
103 has a history which may be instructive in understanding 
some of the challenges to implementing AV coverage in 
California. 
1. Political History of Proposition 103 
 The historian Edward Gibbon often noted that the fate of 
nations frequently turned on the “chance of arms.”33  The 
phrase reflects that battles often have unpredictable 
outcomes.  One may think of Proposition 103 as the last 
soldier still standing after the “Tort Wars” of the late 1980’s.34 
In a 1986 skirmish, insurance and defense interests were 
successful in persuading voters to adopt Proposition 51.35  
Proposition 51 limited defendants’ responsibility for non-
economic harm to each defendant’s share of relative fault.36  
This victory emboldened the defense side and galvanized the 
opposition of those representing claimants’ interests.37  Each 
drew its battle lines with proposed legislation and further 
propositions. 
Representatives of some of the warring parties agreed to 
parle at Frank Fat’s restaurant in Sacramento.  With then 
Speaker of the House, Willie Brown, shuttling among the 
belligerents’ tables, the parties outlined a treaty on a 
Napkin.38  This has become known as the “Napkin Deal,” and 
 
 32. MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1440 (Ct. App. 2010).  
The sections of Proposition 103 are found in CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.01–1861.14 
(West 2011). 
 33. EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE 
ROMAN EMPIRE 399 (1831). 
 34. See Wells, supra note 16; Stephen D. Sugarman, California’s Insurance 
Regulation Revolution: The First Two Years of Proposition 103, 27 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 683, 683–86 (2010); Regulation Modernization, INS. INFO. INST., 
http://www.iii.org/issue_updates/Regulation-Modernization.html (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2012).  Every decade seems to have its “Tort Wars.”  See, e.g., Dan 
Walters, Tort Wars Are Being Revived, MOSCOW-PULLMAN DAILY NEWS, Dec. 
13, 1996, at 8B, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers? 
nid=2026&dat=19961213&id=T1996121BAJ&sj8qAAAAIBAJ&sjid=i9AFAAAA
IBAJ&pg=4443,1187484.  The battles of the 1980’s, however, are most relevant 
to the insurance issues presented by AVs. 
 35. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1192 (1988). 
 36. See id.; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2011). 
 37. See Sugarman, supra note 34. 
 38. See Rodney R. Moy, Tobacco Companies, Immune No More—California’s 
Removal of the Legal Barriers Preventing Plaintiffs from Recovering for 
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a copy occupies a place of honor in the lobby of Frank Fat’s.39  
It was too much to hope for “piece in our time,” but the 
belligerents did agree to some modest legislative reforms and 
a five-year armistice in which they would cease seeking tort 
reform in either the legislature or by initiative.40  The 
agreement included a disarmament provision in which the 
parties entered into contracts with the main petition 
signature gathering businesses in California in order to make 
it difficult for them to work for either side during the 
armistice.41 
The legislative portion of the Napkin Deal passed 
through the committees of both houses, was adopted by both 
houses, and was signed by the Governor within three days of 
the famous meal at Frank Fat’s.42  This seemed like unseemly 
haste to many stakeholders who believed they had been 
either left out of the negotiations or had been poorly 
represented in the process.43  Consequently, an insurgency 
formed among those who did not accept that they were bound 
by the Napkin Deal.44 
Thus, in 1988 the parties again cast their lot to the 
chance of arms.  This year saw five ballot initiatives directed 
towards tort reform or insurance.  Several were cunningly 
designed so that, if they passed and received more votes than 
a rival proposition that also passed, the one with the greater 
number of votes would supplant the rival.  When the cannon 
thunder ceased and the smoke of battle cleared, Proposition 
103 was the only proposition to pass. 
Proposition 103 radically changed insurance law and 
regulation in California.  Among other things, it changed 
California from a free-market state to a state in which most 
rates charged by insurers are set by regulation.45  Even 
though Proposition 103 promised voters a 20% roll back in 
 
Tobacco-Related Illness, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 761, 770 (1998). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.; Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The 
Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 543 (1999). 
 41. See JAMES RICHARDSON, WILLIE BROWN: A BIOGRAPHY 348–49 (1996). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. at 350–51. 
 44. Id. (“[T]he narrowness of the participation in the napkin deal brought a 
narrow result. Consumer groups vowed to get even.”). 
 45. See 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 8 Cal. 4th 216, 299–300 (1994). 
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their rates, it nevertheless passed by a slim margin46—less 
than 51%.47  The voters never received their anticipated 20% 
roll back—that portion of the Proposition was declared 
unconstitutional.48  The California Supreme Court ruled that 
it was “confiscatory” and held that insurers are entitled to a 
“fair and reasonable” return on their investment.49 
Invalidating the 20% roll back removed a major incentive 
for voters to support the Proposition.  Despite the slim 
margin of victory, the Court nevertheless upheld the 
Proposition’s severability clause and also upheld most of the 
Proposition’s remaining provisions.50  These changes 
included: 
 Moving California from a state in which rates are 
regulated by the market place to a state in which most 
rates must receive prior approval (a “prior approval” 
state in insurance parlance).51 
 Changing the office of Commissioner of Insurance from 
an appointed office to an elected office.52 
Forbidding the charging of any rate unless the insurer files a 
complete rate application with the commissioner.53 
 Mandating a “Good-Driver” discount of at least twenty 
percent (a discount, as explained later, that turns 
largely on traffic convictions and/or “principally at-fault 
accidents”).54 
 
 46. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01 (West 2011). 
 47. See Should State Regulate Health Insurance Premiums?, CAL. 
HEALTHLINE (June 20, 2011), http://www.californiahealthline.org/think-
tank/2011/should-state-regulate-health-insurance-premiums.aspx. 
 48. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 832 (1989). 
 49. Id. at 819.  Based on Article II, section 12 of the California Constitution: 
statutes may not identify “any private corporation to perform any function . . . .”  
Id.  The court also struck down the portion of Proposition 103 that created a 
consumer-advocacy corporation.).  CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10(c) (West 2011). 
 50. Calfarm Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d at 821–22, 839–41 (“[I]t seems eminently 
reasonable to suppose that those who favor the proposition would be happy to 
achieve at least some substantial portion of their purpose.”).  Given the allure 
and heavy promotion of the twenty percent role back, one may legitimately 
wonder whether the voters understood the cross-subsidies and other 
consequences of Proposition 103.  Compare Nevada where their equivalent of 
Proposition 103 was struck down in its entirety.  See Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v. 
Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512–15 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 51. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(b). 
 52. Id. § 12900(a) (West 2006). 
 53. Id. § 1861.05(b) (West 2011). 
 54. Id. §§ 1861.02(b), 1861.025. 
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 Requiring that the top three rating factors for auto 
insurance must be, in descending order of importance: 
(1) insured’s driving safety record, (2) miles driven 
annually, and (3) years of driving experience.55 
Whether prior approval or one of the more open-
competition based systems saves consumers money may be 
fairly debated.  Proposition 103 did little to address the major 
costs that drive automobile insurance rates—the costs of 
adjusting, defending and paying claims.  Some restrictions 
extend to executive compensation (at least to the extent that 
it can be counted as a legitimate cost in rate making),56 
efficiency standards for the costs of reasonably efficient 
insurers,57 permitted rates of return,58 and maximum and 
minimum permitted earned premium.59 
One can argue that these are merely the icing on the 
cake.  The “cake” is the cost of the product being sold—
defending and paying claims.  Major cost containment 
developments in this arena all occurred outside the purview 
of Proposition 103.  For example, Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s 
Fund Insurance Co.60 eliminated third-party bad faith claims; 
Thing v. La Chusa61 narrowed the circle of parties who may 
recover for negligently caused emotional damages; State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell62 
restricted the amount of punitive damages that may be 
awarded for torts; Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, 
Inc.63 greatly reduced the amount recoverable under the 
 
 55. Id. § 1861.05(a). 
 56. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2644.10 (2008) (excluded expenses). 
 57. Id. tit. 10, § 2644.12 (efficiency standard). 
 58. Id. tit. 10, §§ 2644.15–2644.16. 
 59. Id. tit. 10, §§ 2644.2–2644.3. 
 60. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 304 (1988). 
 61. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 647 (1989). 
 62. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–17 
(2003); see JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD:  THE STORY OF CAMPBELL 
V. STATE FARM (2008).  Bad faith judgments, one major source of punitive 
damages, may not be counted as an expense for ratemaking purposes.  CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2644.10(c).  Punitive damages are sometimes not covered 
either because directly or indirectly excluded by the policy language, or because 
of public policy.  See Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insuance for Punitive Damages, 
1998 WIS. L. REV. 101 (1998); PPG Indus. Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co, 20 Cal. 
4th 310, 318–19 (1999) (no coverage for punitive damages).  Insurers may, 
nevertheless, be obliged to defend a claim which includes punitive damages.  
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 162 Cal. App. 3d 939, 946 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 63. Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal. 4th 541, 548 
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collateral source rule when medical bills are covered by 
health insurance; California Civil Code section 3333.4 
eliminated pain and suffering claims for injured drunk or 
uninsured drivers; Truman v. Vargas64 established that 
failure to wear a seat belt is contributory negligence; and 
California Civil Code section 1431.2 (Proposition 51) limited 
liability for noneconomic damages (i.e., pain and suffering) to 
each defendant’s portion of fault.65  In addition, automobiles 
are safer today than in the past, and the number of fatalities 
per miles driven is steadily dropping.66  Insurers also have 
developed more sophisticated ways to streamline and reduce 
the costs of automobile repairs by, for example, adopting 
arrangements with automobile repair facilities.67  All of these 
changes in tort law, automobile design, and automobile repair 
took palpable slices out of the cake and reduce the overall cost 
of insuring drivers. 
Although adopted by the barest majority, Proposition 103 
may be amended by the legislature only by a two-thirds vote, 
and then only if the legislation “further[s] [the] purposes” of 
Proposition 103.68  Thus, Proposition 103 and the regulations 
adopted by the Department of Insurance are the matrix in 
which most (but not all) insurance is sold and regulated in 
California.69 
 
(2011).  There is currently a bill before the California legislature to modify the 
Howell decision.  S.B. 1528, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 64. Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 983–84 (Ct. App. 1969). 
 65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West 1988); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3333.2(a)–(b) (West 1988) (limiting pain and suffering in medical malpractice 
cases to $250,000).  The $250,000 cap, which was adopted in 1975, was not 
indexed for inflation.  In 2010 dollars the cap is worth only about $58,112.  
Today it would cost about $1,001,569 to purchase what could be purchased for 
$250,000 in 1975.  S. Morgan Friedman, THE INFLATION CALCULATOR, 
http://www.westegg.com/inflation/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
 66. See Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Traffic Safety Performance 
(Core Outcomes) Measures for California, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/ 
departments/nrd-30/ncsa/STSI/6_CA/2008/6_CA_2008.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 
2012). 
 67. See CAL. INS. CODE § 758.5 (West 1988) (insurer may not require 
insured to use a particular auto repair facility, but insurer may truthfully 
explain the benefits of using the automobile repair facility with which the 
insurer has a relationship). 
 68. See Found. for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. 
App. 4th 1354, 1365–66 (Ct. App. 2005) (invalidating legislation that did not, in 
the court’s view, further the purposes of Proposition 103). 
 69. For example, health insurance rates are not regulated in California.  
There is currently a bill before the California Legislature, A.B. 52 2010–2011 
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II. INSURANCE ISSUES AND AVS 
A. Liability Coverage in the Standard Automobile Insurance 
Contract 
The standard automobile insurance contract contains a 
bundle of coverages.  Some are “first-party” coverages.  These 
coverages give a claim directly against the policyholder’s 
insurer.70  Among these are: comprehensive (covering such 
things a falling trees, collisions with animals, etc.), collision 
(covering the policyholder’s automobile for damage to it from 
other accidents whether or not there is fault on the part of 
any party), medical payments coverage (“MedPay”—covering 
medical expenses up to a usually fairly modest limit), and 
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) (covering, up to a 
limit, the insured person, family member, or person occupying 
the covered automobile for their damages, including bodily 
injury and pain and suffering, if they are legally entitled to 
recover them from the owner or operator of an 
uninsured/underinsured motor vehicle).  There may also be 
some other modest coverages, such as reimbursement for 
towing and rental. 
To the extent these coverages are triggered against one’s 
own insurance company without the need of a finding of fault 
on the part of anyone, they may not present interesting or 
unique challenges in a world of AVs.  Presumably, owners of 
AVs will continue to want comprehensive, collision, MedPay, 
and UM coverage for their vehicles, and presumably insurers 
will continue to see a business opportunity in writing the 
coverages. 
The question becomes more perplexing, however, when 
“liability” is required to trigger coverage.  Liability almost 
always turns on some level of fault.  While it is common to 
speak of an automobile as “covered,” in reality the liability 
coverage under the policy only extends to a constellation of 
people or entities who bear some relationship to the 
automobile or the insured (e.g., the owner, the insured, the 
 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), and possibly a ballot initiative for the November 2012 
ballot aimed at requiring approval of health insurance rates. 
 70. See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399 n.2 (1989) 
(“[I]f the insured is seeking coverage against loss or damage sustained by the 
insured, the claim is first party in nature.  If the insured is seeking coverage 
against liability of the insured to another, the claim is third party in nature.”). 
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insured’s family, or a permissive driver of the car).  Typical 
language may provide words to the effect that the insurer will 
pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which 
any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an 
auto accident.71  The policy will also provide that the insurer 
will defend and, if it thinks appropriate, settle any such 
claim.  Similarly, UM coverage is triggered only when the 
policyholder is “legally entitled” to recover from the other 
motorist.  In both cases, the coverage attaches only when 
either the covered person or the owner or operator of the UM 
vehicle is at fault.  Fault usually requires negligence, and in 
the context of automobiles, negligence usually flows from the 
violation of one of the many rules of the road.72 
 If the owner properly maintains an AV and the vehicle 
drives itself, there is a serious question whether the innocent 
“driver” (if that is even a proper description of the person’s 
role) is “legally” responsible.  The coverage may not be 
triggered because no one is either “legally responsible” or 
“legally entitled.” 
The State of Nevada recently adopted regulations for 
licensing the testing of AVs in the state.  The regulations 
would require insurance in the minimum amounts required 
for other cars “for the payment of tort liabilities arising from 
the maintenance or use of the motor vehicle.”73  The 
 
 71. See, e.g., United Serv. Auto. Assn. v. Lilly, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1396, 1399 
(Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). 
 72. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(b) creates a rebuttable presumption that 
violation of a statute, ordinance or regulation is a failure to exercise due care.  
CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(b) (West 1988).  There are exceptions.  See, e.g., CAL. 
VEH. CODE § 40831 (West 2007) (“In any civil action proof of speed in excess of 
any prima facie limit declared in Section 22352 at a particular time and place 
does not establish negligence as a matter of law but in all such actions it shall 
be necessary to establish as a fact that the operation of a vehicle at the excess 
speed constituted negligence.”) (emphasis added). 
 73. NEV. ADMIN. CODE. § 482.2(2) (2011).  Any licensee who wishes to 
operate for testing purposes an autonomous vehicle on any of the Nevada 
highways must continuously maintain and: 
a.  Provide proof of liability insurance that is equal to or greater than 
the minimum liability requirements for the State of Nevada: 
1.  In the amount of $15,000 for bodily injury to or death of one 
person in any one accident; 
2.  Subject to the limit for one person, in the amount of $30,000 for 
bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one 
accident; and 
3.  In the amount of $10,000 for injury to or destruction of property 
of others in any one accident, for the payment of tort liabilities 
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regulation, however, does not suggest how the tort liability 
may arise.  If there is no fault on the part of the operator or 
owner, then liability may arise, if at all, only for the 
manufacturer or supplier.  Manufacturers and suppliers are 
not “insureds” under the standard automobile policy—at least 
so far.  Thus, for the reasons stated above, owners, 
manufacturers and suppliers may fall outside the coverage of 
the policy. 
Although the Nevada regulations do not clearly address 
the rules governing tort liability, the regulations will make it 
much easier to resolve issues surrounding the cause of 
accidents.  AVs licensed under the proposed regulations must 
save the data for at least thirty seconds prior to any 
collision.74  This feature should also reduce the costs of 
resolving factual disputes. 
At this writing, Bills addressing AVs are pending in other 
states, including Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii and 
Oklahoma.75  Doubtless many more will follow. 
 
arising from the maintenance or use of the motor vehicle. 
4.  An operator’s policy will not be accepted by the Department as 
proof of financial responsibility for an autonomous vehicle. 
Id.  A.B. 511, 76th Leg. Sess. (Nev. 2011) revised Nevada Revised Statutes, Ch. 
483, to require the Nevada Department of Transportation to “[s]et forth 
requirements for the insurance that is required to test or operate an 
autonomous vehicle on a highway within this State.”  NEV. REV. STAT. § 
482A.100(b) (2011).  The statute, however, does not address policy content or 
related tort issues. 
 74. AVs must have: 
[A] separate mechanism, in addition to, and separate from, any other 
mechanism required by law, to capture and store the autonomous 
technology sensor data for at least thirty seconds before a collision 
occurs between the autonomous vehicle and another vehicle, object or 
natural person while the vehicle is operating in autonomous mode.  The 
autonomous technology sensor data must be captured and stored in a 
read-only format by the mechanism so that the data is retained until 
extracted from the mechanism by an external device capable of 
downloading and storing the data.  Such data must be preserved for 2  
years after the date of the collision. 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.8(2)(b). 
 75. H.B. 2679, 47th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005); S.B. 1298 2011–2012 Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2012); C.S./H.B. 1207, 2012 Leg. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 2238 26th Leg. 
(Haw. 2012); H.B. 3007 2nd Sess. 53d Leg. (Okla. 2012).  A web site that tracks 
legislative developments with respect to autonomous vehicles is  Automated 
Driving: Legislative and Regulatory Action, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC., 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legislative_an
d_Regulatory_Action (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). 
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B. Possible Insurance Frameworks for AVs 
Looking into this crystal ball, there are several 
considerations that will weigh in favor of a continuing role for 
automobile insurance.  However safer AVs may be, they will 
still be dangerous and will spin off injuries.  The present 
public policy that requires auto insurance, or proof of 
sufficient assets to respond to damages at some level, will not 
change.76  Because of the comprehensive adoption of rules of 
the road, it is rare for an accident to occur where one or more 
drivers, who all must carry insurance, is not at fault.77  If 
there is no one at fault in a collision involving a fully 
autonomous vehicle, how are injured members of the public to 
be protected? 
1. Products Liability 
One possible approach would be to invoke the various 
doctrines of products liability law.  This would attach the 
major liability to sellers and manufacturers of the vehicle.  
However, it is doubtful that this is an acceptable approach for 
several reasons.  For example, while some accidents are 
catastrophic, fortunately most accidents cause only modest 
damages.  By contrast, products liability lawsuits tend to be 
complex and expensive.  Indeed, they may require the 
translation of hundreds or thousands of engineering 
documents—perhaps written in Japanese, Chinese or 
Korean.78 
The standards for establishing a design defect are vague 
and unpredictable.  In California, a design defect may be 
established by either (1) showing the product “failed to 
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect 
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable 
manner,”79 or (2) showing, “through hindsight” the product’s 
 
 76. CAL. VEH. CODE § 16020 (West 2007). 
 77. Id.  Collisions with pedestrians and other objects may or may not 
implicate fault on the part of a driver.  E.g., Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal. 2d 712, 714 
(1953) (holding that driver who struck pedestrian was not negligent as a matter 
of law). 
 78. See In re Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 687 F.2d 501, 505 (1st 
Cir. 1982) (stating each party to bear translation costs of documents requested 
by it but cost possibly taxable to prevailing party).  Translation costs of 
Japanese documents in range of $250,000, and translation costs of additional 
Spanish documents may exceed that amount.  Id. 
 79. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432 (1978). 
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design embodies “excessive preventable danger.”80  If an 
injured party can make a preliminary showing that the injury 
was proximately caused by the “design” of the product, then 
the burden of proof shifts to the supplier or manufacturer to 
show that the product was not defective.81  When dealing with 
a sophisticated product, the consumer expectation test may 
be difficult to apply.82  The standard for establishing a 
manufacturing defect may be equally vague and very 
expensive to prove.83  Moreover, cars are designed to last, but 
innovative companies may or may not exist at the time of an 
accident—even General Motors narrowly avoided oblivion.84 
2. Insurance Coverage After Acquisitions 
Assuming much of the liability (and insurance) burden 
were to switch to manufacturers or suppliers, difficult 
insurance issues may arise when innovative companies enter 
the market, leave the market, or are acquired by others.  
Most policies insuring product risks are “occurrence” policies.  
Claims arising during the policy period, whether known or 
unknown, are covered.  These policies typically contain a 
clause forbidding assignment without the consent of the 
insurer.85  This clause protects the insurer from additional, 
un-bargained for risks the new enterprise may present. 
An acquiring entity, either by operation of law or by 
contractual assumption of liability, may be responsible for 
injuries caused by the predecessor’s product.  While coverage 
of claims occurring after an acquisition would be governed by 
 
 80. Id. at 430. 
 81. “[W]e conclude that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that 
the injury was proximately caused by the product’s design, the burden should 
appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, 
that the product is not defective.”  Id. at 431. 
 82. Soule v. Gen. Motors Co., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 569–70 (1994) (consumer 
expectation test inapplicable to crashworthiness of design because ordinary 
consumer would have no idea how it should perform in crash).  One could see 
courts accepting similar arguments with respect to sophisticated computer 
systems. 
 83. For example, was there a “bug” in the program?  Were “bugs” expected 
in innovative technology? 
 84. See Nick Bunkley, G.M. Drops Application for Federal Energy Loan, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/business/28 
auto.html?_r=1&ref=autoindustry. 
 85. A typical clause may read: “Assignment of interest under this policy 
shall not bind the [insurer] until its consent is endorsed hereon.”  Kenneth C. 
Newa, Corporate Successor Liability: Insurer’s Perspective, 41 BRIEF 60 (2011). 
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the restriction on assignment, what coverage exists for pre-
acquisition occurrences?  One may argue that the bargained 
for risk, the “occurrence,” has already attached, thus there is 
no enhanced risk to the insurer by permitting assignment of 
the coverage to the successor entity. 
The leading Ninth Circuit case, Northern Insurance Co. 
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.86 so held (at least as to 
liability imposed as a matter of law from the sale of the 
predecessor’s assets).  Regardless of the characteristics of the 
successor, “the insurer still covers only the risk it had 
evaluated when it wrote the policy.”87 
Unfortunately, the issue is no longer so straightforward.  
In a later asset acquisition case, in which the acquiring party 
assumed all liabilities by contract, the California Supreme 
Court rejected the argument that the benefits of the policy 
can be assigned with respect to a pre-acquisition occurrence 
that has not been “reduced to a sum of money due or to 
become due under the policy.”88  Such an inchoate claim does 
not rise to the level of an assignable “chose in action” under 
California law.89  Additionally, the insurer’s risk may be 
increased because the insurer’s duty to defend may now 
extend to two entities (the transferor and the transferee), 
rather than to the one entity that was the insured under the 
original bargain.90  The Court left open the question of 
whether coverage rights would have existed had the liability 
arisen as a matter of law.  Other courts have adopted slightly 
more nuanced positions. 91 
 
 86. N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th 
Cir. 1992). 
 87. Id. at 1358. 
 88. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 29 Cal. 4th 934, 945 
(2007). 
 89. Id. at 944. 
 90. Id. at 944–45. 
 91. In Pilkington North America v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., the 
policy was assignable because “a chose in action arises under an occurrence-
based policy at the time of the covered loss.”  Pilkington N. Am. v. Travelers 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 121, 129 (Ohio 2006).  The court left open the 
transferability of the right to a defense.  Id. at 129.  By contrast, the court in 
Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., held the rights assignable 
only if at the moment of assignment “the policyholder could have brought its 
own action against the insurer for coverage . . . .  [A]t a minimum the losses 
must have been reported to give rise to the chose in action.”  Travelers Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 895 N.E.2d 1172, 1180 (Ind. 2008).  Other cases 
collected and suggestions on how to structure acquisitions are included in 
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If the product seller is extant and has sufficient assets, 
the vagaries of coverage are largely a headache for the 
company rather than the injured party.  Since coverage 
follows the company, not the vehicle, when the company no 
longer exists or is undercapitalized these issues will add an 
additional layer of uncertainty for parties injured by AVs. 
Placing the insurance burden solely on the manufacturer 
or supplier also presents issues of adverse selection and moral 
hazard discussed below.  Public policy would, therefore, 
strongly suggest that there should be a party both financially 
responsible and reasonably accessible.  Assuming public 
entities are not willing to assume the insurance burden, there 
are several possible approaches that bear strong analogies to 
current law. 
 Even if products liability concepts were to dominate this 
area, there still may be some role for fault-based liability on 
the part of AV owners.  Like automobile tires and brakes, 
owners have a responsibility for maintenance and have a 
responsibility to respond if the automobile shows signs that it 
is acting in an untoward way.  Once an owner is or should be 
aware that the automobile is not acting as it should, the 
owner may be negligent in continuing to drive the car until 
the issue is adequately addressed.92  Owners would likely 
want to insure against this possible liability. 
3. Strict Liability When an AV Is “At Fault” 
Present law in California makes the owner of a vehicle 
responsible, up to the minimum required coverage for liability 
insurance, for accidents caused by the fault of any permissive 
user of the automobile.93  Thus, when the actual driver is at 
fault, the owner is liable without fault for the driver’s 
actions.94  Perhaps the next step might be to make the owner 
liable when the owner’s automobile is “at fault” in the sense 
that it violates one of the many rules of the road that would 
 
Newa, supra note 85; Joseph Thacker et al., Do Rights Transfer Under 
Occurrence-Based General Liability Insurance Policies After the Sale of a 
Business?, 41 BRIEF 52 (2011). 
 92. Fremont Comp. Ins. Co. v. Hartnett, 19 Cal. App. 4th 669, 675–77 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (holding that defendant’s failure to maintain brakes raised a 
presumption of negligence). 
 93. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17150 (West 2007). 
 94. See Wildman v. Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 39–40 (1957). 
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have imposed liability on a human driver.  If tort law were to 
take this step, owners would want this liability insured. 
Owner liability for permissive drivers, at least as 
presently constructed, is capped at a very modest amount.95  
Under the current liability regime, drivers, however, must 
respond for all the damages for which they are responsible.  
Assuming drivers have or may have assets, they are 
motivated to insure well beyond these modest limits.  Thus, 
under the present structure, injured parties often have 
available assets well beyond the minimum limits.96  
Policymakers, such as legislatures, will have to decide 
whether strict liability, perhaps with a cap in the absence of 
fault, is an acceptable response for parties injured by AVs. 
Another small step, which may require legislation, might 
involve accepting an analogy to agency law.  An autonomous 
automobile is very much like a driver hired by the owner.  It 
is doing the owner’s bidding, and if the car violates the rules 
of the road and causes an injury, perhaps the owner or the 
one instructing the automobile should be liable as they would 
be for a similar injury caused by the conduct of an agent.97  
Name the car “Jeeves,” and the step may be easier to accept.98 
Courts and legislatures have been somewhat ambivalent 
about this approach.  While imposing limited owner liability 
by statute for the fault of a permissive user, at the same time 
the courts (at least in California) long ago abandoned the 
“Family Purpose Doctrine”—a doctrine which, when 
applicable, made any driver of the car for a family purpose 
the agent of the owner.99  In another example of ambivalence, 
 
 95. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1 (West 1988); CAL. VEH. CODE § 17151(a) 
(West 2007). 
 96. See id. 
 97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 (West 2011) (defining “agent”).  This would be 
similar to the doctrine of respondeat superior where an employer is liable for 
the acts of his employee so long as the acts are within the scope of employment.  
Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, 41 Cal. 3d 962, 967 (1986); Tyson v. Romey, 88 
Cal. App. 2d 752, 755 (Ct. App. 1948); see Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and 
Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739 
(1996). 
 98. See the many humorous stories by P.G. Wodehouse about Bertie 
Wooster and his clever butler, Jeeves.  E.g., Carry on Jeeves, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carry_on,_Jeeves.  The adventures of the sagacious 
valet were presented in the 1990s British sitcom “Jeeves and Wooster.”  Jeeves 
and Wooster (ITV television broadcast 1990–93). 
 99. Johnson v. Peterson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 619, 624, 624 n.4 (Ct. App. 1974).  
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California rejected the liability of a driver for non-negligent 
brake failure, but held the driver could be liable for the 
negligence of the mechanic who had serviced the brakes.100  
Although liability of the driver required fault on the part of 
someone (the automobile mechanic), the duty to maintain the 
brakes in a non-negligent manner was a “nondelegable 
duty.”101  The Court was persuaded, in part, because the 
Vehicle Code at the time provided that every motor vehicle 
“shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the 
movement of the vehicle and to stop and hold the vehicle.”102  
The Vehicle Code also provided that all “[b]rakes and 
component parts thereof shall be maintained . . . in good 
working order.”103  There is little difference between a defect 
 
The doctrine is still applied in some states.  See Nelson v. Johnson, 599 N.W.2d 
246, 248 (N.D. 1999) (“The respondeat superior theoretical basis for the doctrine 
is a fiction created in furtherance of the public policy of giving an injured party 
a cause of action against a financially responsible defendant.”). 
 100. Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 448 (1968).  In the context of workplace 
injuries to employees of independent contractors hired by the defendant, the 
nondelegable duty doctrine has had a tortured history in California.  See 
SeaBright Ins. v. U.S. Airways, 52 Cal. 4th 590, 601–03 (2011). 
 101.  
Unlike strict liability, a nondelegable duty operates, not as a substitute 
for liability based on negligence, but to assure that when a negligently 
caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compensated by the 
person whose activity caused the harm and who may therefore properly 
be held liable for the negligence of his agent, whether his agent was an 
employee or an independent contractor.  To the extent that recognition 
of nondelegable duties tends to insure that there will be a financially 
responsible defendant available to compensate for the negligent harms 
caused by that defendant’s activity, it ameliorates the need for strict 
liability to secure compensation. 
Maloney, 60 Cal. 2d at 446 n.32.  The court noted that “[h]e is the party 
primarily to be benefited by its use; he selects the contractor and is free to insist 
upon one who is financially responsible and to demand indemnity from him; the 
cost of his liability insurance that distributes the risk is properly attributable to 
his activities.”  Id. at 448 (emphasis added). 
 102. Maloney, 60 Cal. 2d at 444. 
 103. Id. at 444.  Proposed AV regulations in Nevada may possibly be read as 
endorsing strict liability when an AV violates a rule of the road.  NEV. ADMIN. 
CODE § 484.1(a)(3) provides: 
A vehicle with autonomous technology shall comply with the statutes 
and regulations applicable to operation of a vehicle on a highway: 
a.  Compliance with the statutes and regulations applicable to 
operation of a vehicle on a highway may be achieved with or 
without a driver depending on the capabilities of the vehicle’s 
autonomous technology; and 
b.   If a driver is necessary due to limitations of the autonomous 
technology, the limitations must be defined in the autonomous 
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that causes the vehicle to fail to brake and a defect that 
causes the brakes to fail.  Again, if legislatures, courts, or 
regulators were to endorse either the agency or nondelegable 
duty approach in order to give injured parties protection 
similar to what they now enjoy (an accessible, legally and 
financially responsible party), automobile owners would need 
to insure against the risk. 
Regardless of what liability scheme is adopted, if there is 
any chance of suits against owners, they will want insurance 
for the purpose of tendering their defense, indemnifying 
losses, or adjusting losses, whether or not suits are filed.  
Auto manufactures that do not have a network of insurance 
adjusters may be ill-suited to deal with the daily grist of auto 
accidents. 
If a design or manufacturing defect in an AV 
substantially contributed to an accident, an insurer that 
insured and indemnified the car owner would be free to 
pursue a claim against the manufacturer.104  Likewise, an 
injured party could similarly pursue a products liability claim 
should the insurance coverage prove inadequate.105  Claims 
exceeding the coverage are more likely to be large enough to 
justify the expense. 
 
technology’s owner’s manual; and 
c.    If a driver is not necessary, the autonomous technology shall be 
granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties 
applicable to the driver of a vehicle, except those provisions 
which by their nature can have no application. 
ADMIN. § 484.1(a)(3) (2011) (emphasis added).  A more recent proposed 
regulation (Dec. 27, 2011), section 482A.3 of the Nevada Administative 
Code provides: “[A] person shall be deemed the operator of an autonomous 
vehicle which is operated in autonomous mode when the person causes the 
autonomous vehicle to engage, regardless of whether the person is 
physically present in the vehicle while it is engaged.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 Section (4)(2) provides that: 
For the purpose of enforcing the traffic laws and other laws applicable 
to drivers and motor vehicles operated in this State, the operator of an 
autonomous vehicle that is operated in autonomous mode shall be 
deemed the driver of the autonomous vehicle regardless of whether the 
person is physically present in the autonomous vehicle while it is 
engaged. 
ADMIN. § 482A.4(2).  It is not clear whether this regulation would impose a 
nondelegable tort duty on the “vehicle” or on the “autonomous technology,” or on 
the “operator” or “driver,” nor is it clear how it would do so. 
 104. See 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
57–62 (3d ed. 2011). 
 105. See id. 
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4. First-Party Insurance 
To the extent that liability of the owner or driver 
diminishes or disappears altogether, injured parties may 
prefer to look towards first-party, rather than third party 
insurance, to make them as whole as possible.  Health 
insurance covering treatment and rehabilitation is an 
example of first-party insurance.106 
One obstacle is that first-party insurance, with rare 
exception, does not compensate for pain and suffering, 
disfigurement, and other items of general damages.  A 
notable exception is the UM coverage mentioned above.107  
This coverage allows the insured to claim against the 
insured’s own insurer the full constellation (up to the policy 
limits) of damages resulting from a collision with an 
uninsured or underinsured motorist who is liable for the 
damages.108  In the new world of truly autonomous vehicles, 
one could imagine a market for expanding this coverage to 
include first-party coverage for injuries caused by AVs when 
there is no liability on the part of the owner of the other 
vehicle.  Somewhat like no-fault insurance, injured parties 
would look first to their own insurers.109 
III. INSURANCE RATES AND POLICIES FOR AVS 
Assuming a continuing role for auto insurance in the 
world of AVs, it may be useful to look at automobile insurance 
in general, and at California in particular, to understand 
some of the issues that may arise. 
 
 
 106. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399 n.2 (1989) 
(“[I]f the insured is seeking coverage against loss or damage sustained by the 
insured, the claim is first party in nature.  If the insured is seeking coverage 
against liability of the insured to another, the claim is third party in nature.”). 
 107. See supra Part II.A. 
 108. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West 2006). 
 109. California offers some no-fault options for insurance.  As noted above, 
some of the coverages in standard automobile policies are first-party, no-fault 
coverages.  See Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Yolo Cnty. Sup. Court, 135 Cal. App. 
4th 263, 268 (Ct. App. 2005); Nager v. Allstate Ins. Co., 83 Cal. App. 4th 284, 
289–90 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Automobile med-pay insurance provides first-party 
coverage on a no-fault basis for relatively low policy limits (generally ranging 
from $5,000 to $10,000) at relatively low premiums. The coverage is primarily 
designed to provide an additional source of funds for medical expenses for 
injured automobile occupants without all the burdens of a fault-based payment 
system.”) (citations omitted). 
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Insurance rates discriminate.  All insurers categorize 
levels of risk and charge premiums in accordance with their 
perception of the risk.  Risk usually is a combination of 
frequency and severity of claims and other costs associated 
with a transfer of risk among different classes of 
policyholders.110  Virtually all states, including California, 
prohibit insurance rates that are “unfairly discriminatory.”111  
Discrimination, in this sense, is not a term intended to apply 
only to suspect classes—such as race or religion—but is a 
term intended to suggest that rates, so far as practical, reflect 
relative risks.112 
While the words “unfairly discriminatory” may suggest 
an element of moral taint, the provenance of the phrase was 
very practical.  The 1871 Chicago fire and the 1906 California 
earthquake and fire sent many insurers into insolvency.113  
One cause was aggressive rate competition in which those 
with influence and power could demand rates below their 
relative risk.114  This either put the insurer’s solvency at risk, 
or the inadequate rate charged to some required that an 
excessive rate be charged to others.  Whether or not one 
considers this “unfair,” it also has practical implications.  
Those who are charged too much will tend to buy less or not 
buy insurance at all.  Those who are charged too little will 
tend to buy more insurance and, possibly, engage in the 
insured activity at an inefficient or careless level.115 
This, in the industry, is called “adverse selection” or 
“moral hazard.”  When adverse selection or moral hazard 
work their mischief, an insurer or industry may go into a 
“death spiral”: as more people buy insurance priced at less 
than the risk, more people decline to buy insurance priced at 
 
 110. MATTHEW J. HASSETT & DONALD STEWART, PROBABILITY FOR RISK 
MANAGEMENT 357 (2009). 
 111. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West 2011). 
 112. See Miller, supra note 11, at 276. 
 113. HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE BETWEEN GLOBAL 
DYNAMICS AND LOCAL CONTINGENCIES 31 (J. David Cummins & Bertrand 
Venard eds., 2007). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See, e.g., Mark Calabria, Bad for Taxpayers and Whales, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 27 2011, 11:34 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/30/ 
who-benefits-from-federal-flood-aid/federal-flood-aid-bad-for-taxpayers-and-
whales (stating under-pricing of Federal flood insurance program encouraged 
building in otherwise unsuitable flood plains as well as inflicted harm on 
whales). 
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more than the risk,116 and those with insurance behave more 
recklessly than they otherwise would.  As this happens, it 
becomes difficult or impossible for the insurer to make its 
business a “zero-sum-game.”  Quite apart from considerations 
of fairness to policyholders, it becomes increasingly difficult 
for an insurer to make up for charging too little for a risk by 
charging others too much.  To the extent public policy 
encourages insurance, the policy is undermined because those 
charged too much are likely to underinsure or drop out of the 
insurance pool altogether.117  In the worst cases, the result 
may be insolvency of the insurer. 
A. Rating Factors 
 Although there are many potential rating factors that 
insurers may use to evaluate risk, practicality and politics 
limit their scope.  A rating factor that is impractical or 
expensive to administer is not workable.  For example, it may 
be best to measure an insured’s driving habits by placing an 
agent of the insurer as a passenger with the insured for a 
week or two.  This is not practical, although Progressive 
Insurance’s heavily promoted new “Snapshot” policy (an 
electronic monitor in the car records the driver’s driving 
habits) is a high-tech surrogate for the ride-along agent.118  
Other insurers are now offering similar policies.   
 Territorial rating (usually by zip code) is highly 
predictive of risk of loss.  Some argue, though, that territorial 
rating, although neutral on its face, de facto discriminates 
against minorities and the poor because they tend to live in 
disproportionate numbers in higher risk neighborhoods.119  
 
 116. See MICHAEL G. FAURE & TON HARTLIEF, INSURANCE AND EXPANDING 
SYSTEMIC RISKS 109 (2003). 
 117. See id.; Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 307 (1937).  “It 
is no longer open to question that the business of insurance is affected with a 
public interest.  Neither the company nor a policyholder has the inviolate rights 
that characterize private contracts.  The contract of the policyholder is subject 
to the reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.”  Id.  The California 
Insurance Code spans 1271 single-space, size ten-font pages and ends with 
section 16030.  See DIMUGNO & GLAD, CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAWS 
ANNOTATED 76–1347 (2011). 
 118. Snapshot, PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE, http://www.progressive.com/auto/ 
snapshot-discount.aspx (last visted Apr. 23, 2012). 
 119. Gary Williams, “The Wrong Side of the Tracks”: Territorial Rating and 
the Setting of Automobile Liability Insurance Rates in California, 19 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 845, 846–47 (1992).  Others disagree.  See Miller, supra note 11, at 
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The California Commissioner, perhaps acceding to this 
concern, permits territorial rating to be used, but at a level of 
significance below its true weight.120 
Credit scoring presents a similar political tug-o’-war.  
Although lively debates surround why one’s credit score 
actuarially relates to risk of loss (is there a causation, a mere 
correlation, or something else?), insurers claim an actuarially 
relevant correlation.121  In a time of economic stress, such as 
now, there is strong political support for disallowing credit 
scoring as a rating factor.  Even during more flush times, the 
argument that credit scoring disadvantages protected groups 
(e.g., racial minorities) enjoys resonance.  Consequently, the 
availability of credit scoring as a rating factor is highly 
contentious.  California’s Commissioner does not allow credit 
scoring as a rating factor.122  Texas does allow it.123  In a 
referendum, Oregon voters defeated a ballot measure that 
would have prohibited credit scoring.124 
Gender politics also plays a role.  It is common knowledge 
that young drivers—especially young male drivers—are less 
safe than more experienced and mature drivers.  Long before 
automobiles and tourist busses crowded the streets of 
Stratford-upon-Avon, Shakespeare recognized this trait.  
Referring to young men, Shakespeare wrote: “I would there 
were no age between sixteen and three-and-twenty; or that 
youth would sleep out the rest; for there is nothing in the 
 
276. 
 120. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 
1187 (Ct. App. 2000); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 2632.5, 2632.7, 2632.8 (2008).  
Prior to 1995 regulations permitted California auto insurers to average the 
sixteen optional rating factors.  If the average weight was less than the weight 
given to the number of years of driving experience (the third-ranked mandatory 
rating factor), the insurer was in compliance with Proposition 103 and the 
pertinent regulations.  Commissioner John Garamendi, as one of his last acts 
before leaving office, revised the regulation so that each optional factor must be 
weighted lower than years of driving experience. Written Testimony of the 
California Farm Bureau Federation, In re proposed Amendment of title 10 
California Code of Regulations, Section 2632.8—Optional Automobile Insurance 
Rating Factors (Mar. 6, 2006) (on file at Santa Clara University School of Law). 
 121. James E Monaghan, The Impact of Personal Credit History on Loss 
Performance in Personal Lines, CAS. ACT. SOC. E-FORUM, Winter 2000, at 79, 
102–03, http://www.casact.org/pubs/forum/00wforum/00wf079.pdf. 
 122. See tit. 10, § 2632.5. 
 123. See Ojo v. Farmers Grp. Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 441–43 (Tex. 2011). 
 124. Oregon Voters Defeat Credit Scoring Ballot Measure, INS. J. (Nov. 8, 
2006), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2006/11/08/74099.htm. 
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between, but getting wenches with child, wronging the 
ancientry, stealing, fighting—Hark you now!” 125 
Over their lives, men, women and transgendered 
individuals also present different constellations of health care 
costs.  Should insurers be permitted to use these gender 
differences as rating factors in setting health or auto 
insurance premiums?  Ambivalence, or perhaps 
schizophrenia, characterizes California’s current approaches 
to the issue.  California recently passed legislation 
prohibiting the use of gender when setting premiums for 
health policies.126  Gender neutrality vanishes, however, when 
rating auto insurance.  Shakespeare’s common sense 
observation still enjoys currency—gender is an approved 
rating factor for auto insurance.127  Moreover, the California 
legislature has the legislative prerogative (subject to federal 
standards) to set rating factors for health insurance.  They do 
not enjoy the same legislative prerogative with respect to 
automobile insurance rating factors.128 
While one may applaud gender neutrality in insurance 
rating as an enlightened step, this may ignore the 
gravitational pull of market forces.  Unless the insurance is 
either de jure or de facto required (qualities enjoyed by 
automobile insurance and, perhaps, health insurance), those 
paying too much are likely to forgo coverage, minimize 
 
 125. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A WINTER’S TALE act III, sc. iii (Henry N. 
Hudson, ed., Boston, Ginn & Co. 1898).  Some editions widen the age of 
foolishness to “ten and three-and-twenty.”  See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, A 
WINTER’S TALE, act III, sc. iii (Cross and T. Brooke, ed., Yale Univ. 1993).  
Shakespeare should know.  He got Anne Hathaway with child when he was 
eighteen years old and married her in some haste.  STEPHEN GREENBLATT, 
WILL IN THE WORLD 120–21 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2004). 
 126. CAL. INS. CODE § 10140.2(a) (West 2006) (“Notwithstanding Section 
10140, a health insurance policy issued, amended, or renewed on or after 
January 1, 2011, shall not be subject to premium, price, or charge differentials 
because of the sex of any contracting party, potential contracting party, or 
person reasonably expected to benefit from the policy as a policyholder, insured, 
or otherwise.”).  Subsection (b) included gender identity within the definition of 
“sex.”  INS. § 10140.2(b).  Regulations to implement gender neutrality for sexual 
identity are presently pending before the California Department of Insurance.  
40-2 Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 1647, Oct. 14, 2011. 
 127. Tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(9) (stating optional rating factor Number 9 includes 
“Gender of the rated driver.”). 
 128. Found. for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. App. 
4th 1354, 1372 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating Commissioner of Insurance, rather than 
legislature, is empowered to adopt optional rating factors). 
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coverage, or seek alternatives.  The favored group is also 
likely to purchase too much because it is a “good deal.”  If the 
difference in cost or value is palpable, in the fullness of time 
those paying too much may fade from the market, and those 
paying too little, absent the subsidy flowing to them from 
those paying too much, will find themselves in a pool of only 
those formally favored by the rating cross-subsidy.  This pool, 
then, will pay the appropriate rates for their risk, and any 
benefit from the cross-subsidy, from those who might have 
paid too much, should disappear. 
Of course, AVs do not have gender or credit ratings.  The 
vehicles are, however, garaged in disparate zip codes and are 
driven in localities and at times (e.g., busy commute hours 
compared with off-peak hours) presenting disparate risks.  It 
is even possible that different operating systems or hardware, 
like different drivers, may present different risk profiles.  
Aging hardware is likely analogous to aging drivers.  How all 
this will play out, and who will call the plays (legislatures, 
insurers, commissioners) will be interesting. 
If those injured by driverless vehicles were left with only 
a claim against the manufacturer (a “products liability” 
claim), similar dislocations may occur.  Apart from expense 
and complexity, opting for products liability suits as the main 
avenue for compensating injuries invites some other adverse 
consequences.  The products liability insurer is in a poor 
position to rate the policy based on the relevant traits of the 
vehicle driver or owner.  Thus, many rating factors, such as 
annual miles driven, territory, use, and multiple vehicle 
discounts, would be irrelevant or nearly so.129 
Since the manufacturer cannot rate the individual 
purchaser, the rates passed through to the purchaser will be 
based on average driver/owner traits over the pool of 
driver/owners.  This may result in cross-subsidies and 
adverse selection.  A simple example: the frequency of 
accidents is closely related to the number of miles driven.  
When setting rates130 an insurance company accounts for the 
number of miles driven by the insured and the particular use 
 
 129. A fully autonomous vehicle should eliminate the possibility of human 
error. 
 130. See Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 
1184 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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(e.g., commuting or pleasure) to which the vehicle is put.  A 
manufacturer would not.  There is a fairly linear relationship 
between the number of miles driven and the risk. Assume 
that $100 per year represents the mileage risk when a car is 
driven 1000 miles per year.  Let’s assume that $2000 would 
be the appropriate premium for a car driven 20,000 miles per 
year.  If the average annual mileage for the manufacturer’s 
fleet of AVs is 10,000 miles annually, one would expect the 
product liability insurance load for the manufacturer to be 
approximately $1000 per year per car multiplied by the 
average life of the cars.  This cost would be passed on to the 
purchasers in the up-front price of the car, perhaps spread 
over time if financed. 
Thus, drivers who drive only 2000 miles would be 
charged too much, and drivers who drive 20,000 miles would 
be charged too little.  Consequently, drivers of AVs, like 
diners at an all-you-can-eat restaurant, would be inclined to 
drive too much (“Moral Hazard”).131  Low mileage drivers, who 
are charged too much, would also more likely select ordinary 
cars over AVs because ordinary cars are more accurately 
rated and, therefore, less expensive to operate.  Those driving 
more than average would more likely select AVs because they 
are charged too little (“Adverse Selection”).  This also 
undermines whatever benefits flow from the new Pay-As-You-
Drive policies.  Likewise, a driver who instructs the car to 
drive conservatively (assuming the future holds such 
possibilities) would pay the same insurance as one who 
instructs the car to drive more aggressively (e.g., entering a 
command to change into a faster lane whenever possible).  
Both examples would encourage overuse or possibly misuse of 
the product. 
As current rating factors for self-driving vehicles lose 
relevance,132 the manufacturer’s inability to reflect these 
rating factors in the price is also irrelevant.  Moreover, the 
statutes and regulations applying to automobile policies 
under Proposition 103 simply do not apply to the commercial 
general liability, products liability, or multi-risk policies that 
 
 131. One might argue that the high mileage driver may replace the car more 
frequently, thus paying an additional “premium” with the more frequent 
purchases. 
 132. For example, driving safety record, years of driving experience, 
academic standing, non-smoker, to name a few. 
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suppliers and manufacturers purchase to cover risks from 
their products.  These are not automobile policies within the 
definition of Proposition 103 and California Insurance Code 
section 660(a).  Indeed, suppliers and manufacturers, unlike 
automobile owners, are free to forgo insurance altogether. 
B. Examples of Difficulty in Setting Rates for New 
Technologies 
1. Airbags 
One may cite two examples where the move from testing 
to real life experience diverged.  When airbags were first 
introduced, they were estimated to save 9000 lives per year.133  
However, between 1987 and 2001 airbags saved 8369 lives 
and caused approximately 291 deaths between 1990 and July 
2008.134  Thus, an insurer basing its rates on the estimated 
efficacy of air bags would have missed the mark.  Even with 
the benefit of hindsight, however, past is not necessarily 
prologue.  During this same period airbags consistently 
improved.  On/Off switches were added, the deployment force 
was reduced, sensors were added to adjust to an occupant’s 
weight and seat position, and air bags were no longer 
marketed as a substitute for seatbelts.135  One can anticipate 
that the technology enabling AVs, much like today’s 
computers, will rapidly advance in such a way that 
predictions from prior experience may be very poor predictors 
of future loss trends. 
2. ABS Brakes 
The second example is ABS brakes.136  When first 
introduced, many assumed that they would reduce accident 
 
 133. NIDHI KALRA ET AL., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS 
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES 38 (2009), http://www.dot.ca.gov/research/research 
reports/reports/2009/prr-2009-28_liability_reg_&_auto_vehicle_final_report_200 
9.pdf; Paul Eisenstein, Airbags Arrive, Muffling an Almost 20 Year Debate, CHI. 
TRIB. (Sept. 3, 1989), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-09-03/ 
travel/8901100288_1_air-bags-equipped-new-cars. 
 134. KALRA ET AL., supra note 134, at 39. 
 135. Id. 
 136. The system prevents wheels from locking during braking, thus 
maximising traction and helping the vehicle avoid going into a skid.  Questions 
and Answers Regarding Antilock Brake Sytem (ABS), NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ASSOC., http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/problems/equipment/absbrakes.html 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
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costs.  For a brief period after their introduction, however, 
accidents actually increased.137  The increase was due to the 
unfamiliarity with the operation and feel of ABS brakes.138  
Many drivers, when they sensed the judder of the brakes as 
they adjusted to the insipient skid of a wheel, assumed the 
brakes were not working properly and pumped the brakes or 
otherwise reacted in a way that reduced their effectiveness.139  
Other drivers may have been encouraged to drive more 
aggressively in reliance on the new ABS systems.140 
C. Proposition 103 and AVs 
Proposition 103 applies to rates and premiums for 
automobile policies “as described in subdivision (a) of Section 
660” of the California Insurance Code.141  Section 660(a) 
defines “policy” as any: 
[A]utomobile liability, automobile physical damage, or 
automobile collisions policy, or any combination thereof  
. . . insuring a single individual or individuals residing in 
the same household [if the automobile is] a motor vehicle 
of the private passenger or station wagon type that is not 
used as a public or livery conveyance for passengers, nor 
rented to others.142 
Thus, as presently drafted, the provisions of Proposition 103 
will govern the insuring of AVs owned by individuals. 
 
 137. Anti-Lock Brakes, HIGHWAY SAFETY RES. AND COMM., 
http://www.iihs.org/research/qanda/antilock.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Self-Driving Cars:  Safer at Any Speed?, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21548992. 
 141. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a) (West 2011).  To the extent insurers were to 
offer and policyholders were to purchase first-party coverage to insure 
themselves against, for example, pain and suffering, California Insurance Code 
section 660 may or may not include that kind of policy within its ambit.  The 
question would turn on whether the policy would be one for “automobile liability 
coverage.”  Section 660(b) provides “ ‘ automobile liability coverage’ includes only 
coverage of bodily injury and property damage liability, medical payments, and 
uninsured motorists coverage.”  CAL. INS. CODE § 660(b) (West 2011) (emphasis 
added).  One could argue that a first-party policy covering the policyholder’s 
general damages, such as pain and suffering, was not a “liability” policy.  On the 
other hand, the policy creates a “liability” on the part of the insurer, therefore it 
may be a policy with “coverage of bodily injury . . . liability.”  Id.  Since the 
definition of “automobile liability coverage” includes “medical payments,” and 
the MedPay provisions of a policy do not require liability on the part of anyone 
other than the insurer, this definition is at least plausible.  Id. 
 142. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 660(a)–(a)(1). 
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The Commissioner of Insurance must approve all rating 
factors.143  While the Commissioner has discretion to approve 
and rank some rating factors, so long as they “have a 
substantial relationship to the risk of loss”144 (referred to as 
the “optional rating factors”), Proposition 103 requires that 
the three most important rating factors determining rates 
and premiums (referred to as the “mandatory rating factors”) 
must be, in the following order: (1) the insured’s driving 
safety record, (2) the number of miles he or she drives 
annually, and (3) the number of years of driving experience 
the insured has had.145 
This order of ranking, however, does not necessarily 
reflect the relative weight of each factor.  Thus, to comply 
with Proposition 103’s mandated ranking, insurers must 
artificially increase or decrease the actual predictive value 
placed on these (and other) rating factors to preserve this 
hierarchy.146  This is called “pumping” when the value of a 
rating factor is increased to move it up in the hierarchy and 
“tempering” when the value of a stronger rating factor is 
artificially decreased in order to move it down in the rating 
order.147  For example, annual miles driven may better predict 
risk of loss than driving safety record.  Driving safety record, 
however, must be the most important rating factor.148  In 
order to comply with Proposition 103 an insurer must 
“temper” the importance of the annual mileage and/or “pump” 
the importance of the driving safety record in order to comply 
with the order mandated by Proposition 103.149  Pumping, 
tempering, or combining the two, is an example of how the 
auto rating factor regulations allow or even compel arbitrary 
rate setting.  Two insurers with identical sets of costs and 
facts can arrive at different rates depending on how each 
approaches the pumping/tempering “fix.” 
 
 
 143. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a)(4). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.; see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5(c)(2)(C) (2008) (listing 
approved auto rating factors). 
 146. Tit. 10, § 2632.8(d); see Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 
Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1190–91 (Ct. App. 2000). 
 147. The process of pumping and tempering is discussed in Spanish Speaking 
Citizens’ Found., 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1229–37. 
 148. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a). 
 149. Id. 
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Pumping and tempering applies both to the three 
mandatory rating factors and to some optional rating factors.  
For example, territory (where a car is garaged or driven) may 
be more predictive than any, or indeed all, of the three 
mandatory rating factors.  Nevertheless, it must be tempered, 
or the three mandatory rating factors must be pumped, in 
order to keep territory ranked below the three mandatory 
rating factors.150  Indeed, current regulations require insurers 
to weigh territory below both the mandatory rating factors 
and any optional rating factors the insurer uses.151 
Tempering the territorial rating factor below its true 
value may well cause a wealth transfer from insureds who 
garage their cars in low risk territories to insureds who 
garage their cars in higher risk areas.  This means, for 
example, that rural drivers may pay more for insurance than 
their risk justifies.  Urban drivers, subsidized by the 
overpayments of rural drivers, pay less.  If one looks at 
mandatory auto insurance as somewhat akin to a tax, this 
presents the prospect of a regressive tax—rural insureds, 
while paying more than their risk suggests, are generally less 
affluent than urban insureds.152  Likewise, pumping years of 
driving experience above more predictive optional rating 
factors means, quite simply, that the age of drivers counts too 
much.  Put another way, risks presented by differences in 
years of driving experience must be exaggerated.  Since risk 
increases with younger drivers and also increases with older 
drivers, these two groups must pay higher premiums than is 
justified by the risk they present.  Thus, in both of these 
examples it may be argued that, rather than protecting 
consumers in general, some consumer groups “win,” and 
others “lose.”  Whether this cross-subsidy is good policy is a 
political judgment made by Proposition 103 and by the 
Commissioner of Insurance when implementing both 
Proposition 103 and the optional rating factors that fall 
 
 150. See tit. 10, § 2632.7. 
 151. Tit. 10, § 2632.7(b)(4) (“[T]he order of analysis of the optional factors 
shall be determined by the insurer, with the exception that frequency band and 
severity band [these are referred to as the territorial rating factors] shall be 
analyzed last.”). 
 152. Written Testimony of the California Farm Bureau Federation, In re 
proposed Amendment of title 10 California Code of Regulations, Section 
2632.8—Optional Automobile Insurance Rating Factors, Mar. 6, 2006 (on file at 
Santa Clara University School of Law). 
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within the Commissioner’s aegis. 
When these cross-subsidies become palpable, it can result 
in adverse selection.  An insured who is charged too little for 
annual mileage because the mileage rating factor has been 
tempered below its predictive value is likely to drive more 
miles than he or she would have, if charged the higher rate.  
The result is similar when annual miles driven cannot, as a 
practical matter, be used by the products liability insurers of 
suppliers and manufacturers.  Additionally, insureds who are 
charged more than their risk warrants are also more likely to 
underinsure or drop out of the pool altogether.  The recently 
approved Pay-as-You-Drive policies are an attempt to address 
this issue with respect to the annual miles driven factor. 
D. Some Mandatory Rating Factors Do Not Work with AVs 
Proposition 103’s mandatory rating factors simply do not 
fit the brave new world of AVs.  The most important factor, 
“driving safety record,” is singularly inapt when the car is 
driverless.153  Indeed, one might expect or encourage a driver 
with a poor record to opt for a driverless car.  Nevertheless, 
Proposition 103 requires the insured’s driving safety record to 
rank as the top-rating factor.  Since driving record was 
singled out in the “Declarations” portion of the Proposition, 
even a two-thirds vote of the legislature to amend it may not 
“further” the Proposition’s purposes.154 
The second rating factor, the “number of miles he or she 
drives annually,” does appear to directly bear on the risk of 
AVs.155  There is a possible statutory interpretation issue with 
the reference to “he or she drives.”  It may be argued that it is 
the car that is driving, not “he or she.”  The proposed Nevada 
regulations referenced above provide that the “operator” (the 
one who engaged the AV) is “deemed the driver.”156 
 
 153. See id.; John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google 
.html?scp=1&sq=autonomous%20vehicles&st=cse (“The technology is ahead of 
the law in many areas.”). 
 154. Section 1 of Proposition 103 declares, among its purposes, “Second, 
automobile insurance rates shall be determined primarily by a driver's safety 
record and mileage driven.”  Text of Proposition 103, CONSUMER WATCHDOG 
(Jan. 1, 2008), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/feature/text-proposition-103. 
 155. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1184 
(Ct. App. 2000). 
 156. NEV. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, LCB File No. R084-11, PROPOSED 
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The third ranking mandatory factor, the “number of 
years of driving experience the insured has had,” again seems 
almost completely inapposite.157  When the driver is merely a 
passenger, the person’s driving experience has little or no 
relevance to risk.  Indeed, one may imagine youngsters who 
could not get a driver’s license, and older people who should 
long ago have surrendered their keys, being ferried about in 
fully autonomous vehicles. 
Proposition 103 also forbids rates that are “unfairly 
discriminatory.”158  Perhaps the most commonly accepted 
definition of unfairly discriminatory in the context of 
insurance is: “An insurance rate structure will be considered 
to be unfairly discriminatory . . . if allowing for practical 
limitations, there are premium differences that do not 
correspond to expected losses and average expenses or if there 
are expected average cost differences that are not reflected in 
premium differences.”159  Applying this definition, one could 
easily argue that pumping and tempering rates is unfairly 
discriminatory.  If the process is mandated by Proposition 
103, the same Proposition that forbids unfairly discriminatory 
rates, it would seem that unfair discrimination may be both 
legal and mandated in California. 
The most sensible approach to this dilemma, at least 
with respect to AVs, would be to abolish or substantially re-
order the three mandatory rating factors.  However, this is 
more easily said than done.  As noted above, amending 
Proposition 103 requires a two-thirds vote of the 
legislature.160  Moreover, section 8(b) of the Proposition 
provides: “The provisions of this act shall not be amended by 
 
REGULATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, available at 
http://www.dmvnv.com/public_meetings/R084-11.pdf. 
 157. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found., 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1184. 
 158. See id. at 1224. 
 159. C. Arthur Williams, Price Discrimination in Property and Liability 
Insurance, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY 209–42 (1969) 
(emphasis added).  Principle four of the CAS Actuarial Statement of Principles 
for Ratemaking states: “A rate is reasonable and not excessive, inadequate, or 
unfairly discriminatory if it is an actuarially sound estimate of the expected 
value of all future costs associated with an individual risk transfer.”  CAS. 
ACTUARIAL SOC., STATEMENT OF PRINCIPALS REGARDING PROPERTY AND 
CAUSALTY INSURANCE RULEMAKING 6 (1988), http://www.casact.org/stand 
ards/princip/sppcrate.pdf. 
 160. See Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. 
App. 4th 1354, 1359 n.1 (Ct. App. 2005). 
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the Legislature except to further its purposes.”161  Both of 
these requirements can be formidable hurdles. 
Persistency discounts serve as an example.  Most are 
aware that their insurer discounts their rates if they have 
been with the insurer for a period of time.162  This is called 
the “persistency discount.”  The discount is usually justified 
on the basis that persistency saves the insurer the producing 
expenses associated with finding a new insured.  If one wants 
to change insurers, Proposition 103 does not permit the 
subsequent insurer to match the persistency discount offered 
by the insured’s current insurer.163  Thus, the second insurer 
could not compete by offering the same discount.  Changing 
insurers, then, was somewhat like a taxable event.  The “tax” 
is the loss of the persistency discount when purchasing the 
new policy. 
The California legislature concluded that this both 
undermined competition and drove up the cost of insurance 
by discouraging the ability to shop for lower rates.  The 
legislature made the following findings: 
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it furthers 
the purpose of Proposition 103 to encourage competition 
among carriers so that coverage overall will be priced 
competitively.  The Legislature further finds and declares 
that competition is furthered when insureds are able to 
claim a discount for regular purchases of insurance from 
any carrier offering this discount irrespective of whether 
or not the insured has previously purchased from a given 
carrier offering the discount.164 
Despite these legislative findings, the Court of Appeal 
held the amendment invalid because, in the Court’s view, it 
did not further the purposes of Proposition 103.165  The Court 
 
 161. Id. at 1364. 
 162. See California Court Strikes Down Persistence Discount Law, INS. J. 
(Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2005/09/30/ 
60326.htm. 
 163. See id. (2003 California law that permitted insureds to switch insurance 
companies and maintain their persistency discount was struck down as not 
furthering the purposes of Proposition 103). 
 164. See Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 1362 
n.6. 
 165. Id. at 1362.  The court also noted that “[t]wo prior attempts by the 
Legislature to amend Proposition 103 have been invalidated by the courts 
because they did not ‘further [the] purposes’ of the initiative, as section 8, 
subdivision (b) requires.”  Id. at 1366 (citing Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 11 
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also held that Proposition 103 vests only the Insurance 
Commissioner with the power to set optional rating factors.166  
Thus, the legislature, even by a super majority, may not be 
authorized to adopt rating factors for auto insurance.  
Following this defeat in the courts, promoters of “portable 
persistency” qualified a ballot initiative to amend this aspect 
of Proposition 103.  With a vote of 51.9% to 48.1%, the 
initiative failed in the June 8, 2010 election.167 
Some statutory interpretation might avoid much of this 
discrimination.  The NAIC, every state, and Proposition 103 
all require that rates may not be “unfairly discriminatory.”  
Proposition 103 also requires that the three mandatory rating 
factors—driving record, annual mileage, and years of driving 
experience—be applied “in decreasing order of importance.”  
The Proposition expressly forbids unfairly discriminatory 
rates, but it does not define “order of importance” or expressly 
require or authorize the pumping and tempering of 
mandatory and optional rating factors.  Another reading more 
closely allied with the universal policy forbidding unfairly 
discriminatory rates might be to interpret the Proposition to 
require only that the mandatory factors be given the 
maximum weight that the underlying data supports.  No 
court has yet adopted this approach, but AVs may be the 
reductio ad absurdum that prompts rethinking the issue.  To 
 
Cal. 4th 1243, 1265 (1995) (stating purposes of Prop. 103 not furthered by 
exempting surety insurance)); Proposition 103 Enforcement Project v. 
Quackenbush, 64 Cal. App. 4th 1473, 1494 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating purposes of 
Prop. 103 not furthered by reducing insurers’ obligation to refund excess 
premiums). 
 166. Id. at 1372 (“Under Proposition 103, therefore, it is the Insurance 
Commissioner rather than the Legislature that is vested with ratemaking 
authority subject to the appropriate ratemaking process.”); CAL. INS. CODE § 
1861.02(a)(4) (West 2011) (“Rates and premium for an automobile insurance 
policy . . . shall be determined  by application of the following factors [listing the 
3 mandatory factors] [and] [t]hose other factors that the commissioner may 
adopt by regulation . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 167. Prop 17 Auto Insurance, U.C. BERKELEY, 
http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/research/quickhelp/elections/2010primary/prop17.
php (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).  Proposition 17 appeared on the June 8, 2010 
ballot.  A similar proposition has been filed with the California Attorney 
General’s office (Initiative 11-0013) and may appear on the November, 2012 
ballot.  See CHANGES LAW TO ALLOW AUTO INSURANCE COMPANIES TO SET 
PRICES BASED ON A DRIVER’S HISTORY OF INSURANCE COVERAGE.  INITIATIVE 
STATUTE (INITIATIVE 11-0013, AMENDMENT #1-S (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i944_title_and_summary_11-
0013_final.pdf (last visited May 15, 2012). 
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count the insured’s driving record and the years of driving 
experience as two of the three most important rating factors 
when, in fact, they are irrelevant when rating a self-driven 
automobile would be, one may modestly suggest, absurd. 
Under Proposition 103 as currently interpreted, there 
may be one or two other rather poor options.  The 
Commissioner can adopt a fourth optional rating factor for 
AVs.168  The type of car being insured is presently among the 
current optional rating factors.169  Even if AVs are 
substantially safer than other vehicles, this rating factor 
must still rank behind driving safety record, miles driven 
annually, and number of years of driving experience.170  
Under such a rating scenario, there would be little motive for 
a driver with a poor driving record to opt for the safer AV.  
The insured’s rates would still be based on the rates that 
would apply were the insured to drive an ordinary vehicle. 
Time is a great leveler.  As bad drivers operate AVs, their 
driving records will improve.  There should be no citations 
and no principally at fault accidents.  In three years’ time one 
would expect the driving record to approach perfection—along 
with all other AV drivers.  This simply illustrates again why 
the insured’s driving record is irrelevant as a rating factor.  
No driver is any better or any worse than any other driver.  
Yet, this irrelevant rating factor must be weighted more than 
other far more relevant factors, such as miles driven, the type 
of vehicle, and territory.  This also illustrates that the rating 
factors related to the type and capacity of the vehicle, rating 
factors that now dwell in the tempered company of other 
optional rating factors, should be allowed to rise to the 
position they deserve. 
Adding AVs to the pool of insured cars may also increase 
the weight of the territorial rating factor.  Although current 
regulations require that territory must rank last among all 
rating factors, as some of those factors fall away, the weight 
of the territorial factor may well rise.  Rather than ranking 
 
 168. INS. § 1861.02(a)(4) (“Those other factors that the commissioner may 
adopt by regulation and that have a substantial relationship to the risk of 
loss.”). 
 169. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(1) (2008). 
 170. Tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(1) (stating the type of vehicle); tit. 10, § 2632.5(d)(8) 
(stating the vehicle characteristics, including engine size, safety and protective 
devices, damageability, reparability, and theft deterrent devices). 
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fifteenth and sixteenth among optional rating factors, 
territory may rise to fifth or sixth place. 
There is a second possible compromise that may help, 
and it requires neither legislation nor a new proposition.  
Prior to the 2006 amendments to the regulations governing 
the rating factors, all of the optional rating factors could be 
averaged together.171  If their average weight, when compared 
to the third mandatory rating factor—years of driving 
experience—was less than the weight of years of driving 
experience, then the insurer’s class plan was in compliance 
with the Proposition.  This method was challenged.  
Recognizing broad discretion in the Commissioner to adopt 
rating factors in compliance with Proposition 103, the Court 
of Appeal upheld this approach.172  As his last regulatory act 
before leaving office, then Commissioner John Garamendi 
scrapped this system and introduced the current system in 
which each optional factor must weigh less than the third 
mandatory factor.  Subsequent Commissioners have not 
sought to revisit this issue.  AVs may catalyze some 
rethinking along this line. 
E. The Good Driver Discount 
Assuming that application of the mandatory rating 
factors is a problem not so intractable that it cannot be 
solved, a California insurer would also face dealing with the 
Good Driver Discount (GDD).  Proposition 103 mandates that 
all insurers offer a GDD “to every person who meets the 
criteria.”173  The regulations adopted pursuant to Proposition 
103 speak in terms of “driver.”174  Those who qualify are 
entitled to a rate “at least 20% below the rate the insured 
would otherwise have been charged.”175  Except for some 
serious offences, such as drunk driving, the basic outline is 
this: 
 
 171. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found. v. Low, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1190 
(Ct. App. 2000); Wells, supra note 16. 
 172. Spanish Speaking Citizens’ Found., 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1185–86. 
 173. INS. §§ 1861.02(b)(1), 1861.025. 
 174. Tit. 10, §§ 2632.13; 2632.13.1. 
 175. INS. § 1861.02(b)(2); The California Code of Regulations section 
2632.12(a) interprets this mandate, changing it to “20 percent less than the 
lowest rate available to a comparable driver who is not a good driver.”  Tit. 10, § 
2632.12(a)  (emphasis added). 
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 A moving violation, which has not been masked by 
going to driving school, receives one point. 
 An accident for which the driver is “principally at fault” 
that resulted in only damage to property exceeding 
$1,000 receives one point.176 
 If principally at fault and the accident resulted in 
bodily injury, the driver receives two points.177 
 If a driver receives two points within a three-year 
period, the insurer may withdraw the GDD.  The driver 
then loses the GDD for at least three years.178 
Class plans also include, as they must, a separate rating 
factor for driving safety record (the first mandatory rating 
factor), and a driving record that counts against the GDD also 
counts against the driving safety record rating factor.179  
Thus, a driver may lose both the GDD and the discount based 
on driving record.  Since driving safety record must be the 
most important rating factor, the loss of both will often cause 
a fifty percent or more rise in premiums. 
The Commissioner of Insurance is instructed by the 
Proposition to adopt regulations setting guidelines to be used 
to determine fault for the purposes of the GDD.180  The 
Commissioner has adopted extensive regulatory guidelines.181 
Very early in the life of Proposition 103 the 
Commissioner adopted a definition of “principally at fault” 
that presents some anomalies.  Proposition 103 does not 
define “principally,” but the Commissioner adopted a 
definition which, at least in theory, allows only one driver in a 
 
 176. INS. § 1861.025(b)(1)(A). 
 177. Results under these two provisions can seem quite arbitrary.  One who 
breaks a headlight on a premium car may well do more than $1000 in damage, 
while the same driver who totals an older and less expensive car may do less 
than $1000 in damage (the salvage value of the car).  In addition, the statute 
and regulations offer no definition of “bodily injury.”  See INS. § 
1861.025(b)(1)(A); tit. 10, § 2632.12(a).  A pregnant woman in a minor accident 
may reasonably incur several thousand dollars in medical bills simply to find 
that she is quite well.  Another person may expend ten dollars on anti-
inflammatory drugs because the person’s back was uncomfortable for a week.  Is 
either, or neither, “bodily injury?” 
 178. Tit. 10, § 2632.13.1. 
 179. Note that, by regulation, only principally-at-fault accidents may be 
counted against the driving safety record rating factor.  See tit. 10, § 2632.13. 
 180. INS. § 1861.025(b)(3). 
 181. Tit. 10, §§ 2632.12, 2632.13, 2632.13.1. 
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multi-vehicle accident to be principally at fault.182  The 
regulation provides that: “An insurer shall not make a 
determination that a driver is principally at-fault for an 
accident unless the driver’s actions or omissions were at least 
51 percent of the legal cause of the accident . . . .”183 
Put another way, one may remain a good driver for the 
purposes of the GDD discount if one is “lucky” enough to have 
another driver equally or more at fault.  Four drivers, all of 
whom run a four-way stop, are all good drivers for this 
purpose (each is only twenty-five percent the legal cause of 
the accident).  Two drivers going thirty miles per hour over 
the limit are both good drivers if they contribute equally to 
the damages.  Drivers insured by different insurers, however, 
could both be found to be principally at fault because the 
insurers need not coordinate their findings.  By contrast, only 
one could be found principally at fault if both happen to be 
insured by the same company. 
The regulations also provide a number of rebuttable 
presumptions that, in certain accident scenarios, the driver is 
not principally at fault.  For example, the driver is rebuttably 
presumed not to be principally at fault if “the vehicle was 
struck in the rear by another vehicle, and the driver has not 
been convicted of a moving traffic violation in connection with 
the accident,”184 or “the driver was not convicted of a moving 
traffic violation and the operator of another vehicle involved 
in the accident was convicted of a moving traffic violation.”185 
Applying the GDD to AVs will present some difficulties 
and some anomalies.  The current definition of principally at 
fault speaks only in terms of causation.186  Perhaps fault is 
implied, but the regulation, at least for accidents in 
California, does not explicitly require fault, nor, if fault is 
implied, does the regulation suggest how culpability is to be 
weighed along with causation. 
If the regulation requires fault on the part of the driver, 
then it is difficult to see how it is to be applied to cars that are 
not driven by a driver.  Even if the principally at fault 
 
 182. See tit. 10, § 2632.13.1. 
 183. Tit. 10, §§ 2632.13(b), 2632.13.1. 
 184. Tit. 10, § 2632.139(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
 185. Tit. 10, § 2632.13(c)(3) (emphasis added). 
 186. Tit. 10, § 2632.13(b) (emphasis added) (“At least 51 percent of the legal 
cause of the accident.”). 
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determination is to be based only on causation, it is difficult 
to see how “the driver’s actions or omissions” satisfied the “at 
least 51 percent” standard.187  Moreover, some of the 
rebuttable presumptions arise only if the “driver” or “the 
operator of another vehicle” has not been convicted of a 
moving traffic violation related to the accident.188  If the car 
has no driver or operator, however substantial the 
contribution to the accident, the AV or its owner will not be 
principally at fault.  Also, if one is to consider fault, then in a 
collision with an AV any ordinary driver who shares any level 
of fault may be principally at fault because the ordinary 
driver is the only driver who shares any fault.  Thus, the 
GDD must be extended to the AV regardless of the 
automobile’s actual risk.  Put another way, all operators of 
AVs would be entitled to an insurance rate twenty percent 
less than the insurer would otherwise charge. 
Since insurance is a zero-sum-game, and an insurer 
would not stay in business long if it charged all of its 
policyholders twenty percent less than it should charge, the 
difference must be made up elsewhere.  At present, it is made 
up from those who do not qualify as good drivers.  If all 
vehicles were autonomous, and all AV “drivers” were good 
drivers, then the system would crash.  There would simply be 
no one to make up the twenty percent in lost premium.  As 
the number of AVs increases and the pool of “not good” 
drivers shrinks, the financial burden on not good drivers 
could be ruinous.  Imagine the premium for the driver who 
has two points in the previous three years and owns the last 
ordinary car in California.  The premium would be tens of 
millions of dollars.  Moreover, the insurer does not have the 
option to make up the difference from other rating groups, 
such as vehicle type, gender, or territory, because to do so 
would likely raise the weight of those groups above the 
mandatory rating factors. 
In order to keep insurance viable and to avoid some of the 
enormous spikes in premiums for “not good drivers,”189 
insurers and the Department adopted regulatory language 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Tit. 10, § 2632.13(c)(3). 
 189. This awkward phrase is apt because it is the language of the regulation 
and because those who are “not good” drivers are not necessarily “bad” drivers. 
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which may be at odds with the Proposition’s language.  
California’s regulatory language bases the GDD rate on the 
rate for “a comparable driver who is not a good driver”190 
rather than the rate “the insured would otherwise have been 
charged.” 
This gloss on the statute causes dramatic changes.  Its 
virtue is that the changes are less dramatic than applying the 
Proposition’s language.  Some simple illustrations follow. 191 
Example #1 
Assume a group of 100 good drivers and 10 not good 
drivers.  Assume in all other respects they are equal.192  
Assume, also, that the premium to cover the good drivers 
would be $100 each, and assume the premium to cover the 
not good drivers would be $110 each.  This pool of insureds 
would generate the need for a total premium of (100 x $100) + 
(10 x $110) = $11,100.  Applying the Proposition’s language, 
the good drivers should be offered a rate of $80 rather than 
$100.  This would generate $8000 in total premium.  Since 
the pool must generate $11,100 in premium, the difference 
($3100) must be made up by the not good drivers.  Since there 
are only ten of them, each not good driver’s premium would 
go from $110 to $310 (i.e., the $3,100 shortfall divided by the 
ten remaining drivers who must share it.) 
Example #2 
The phrase “would otherwise have been charged” is not 
self-defining, so one may approach the calculation differently.  
Apply the same assumptions about the pool and premium as 
above.  If we do not know anything about individual drivers, 
then the premium each driver would otherwise be charged is 
$11,100 divided by 110, or $100.90 each.  One could argue 
 
 190. Compare CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(b) (West 2011) (“[A]t least 20% below 
the rate the insured would otherwise have been charged”) with tit. 10, § 
2632.12(a) (“20 percent less than the lowest rate available to a comparable 
driver who is not a good driver.”) (emphasis added). 
 191. For similar examples of computing rates in the context of the 
persistency rating factor, see Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. 
Garamendi, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1367 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 192. Of course, all things would not be equal.  Some self-driving cars may be 
safer than others.  Some will be more expensive to repair than others.  Some 
will be garaged in neighborhoods less safe than others.  None of these factors, 
however, alters the point of the hypothetical. 
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that $100.90 is what the policyholder “would otherwise have 
been charged.”  Discounting this by 20% yields a good driver 
rate of $80.72 per policy.  This will bring in a total premium 
from the 100 good drivers of $8072.  The balance ($11,100 – 
$8072 = $3028) must be collected from the remaining ten not 
good drivers.  This puts the not good driver’s premium at 
$302.80 each (divide $3028 by 10 for the ten not good drivers).  
The total collected equals the $11,100 necessary to support 
this book of business. 
Example #3 
One can see in this last example that under the 
Proposition’s language the greater the number of not good 
drivers in the relevant pool, the higher the rates for the good 
drivers and the lower the rates for the not good drivers.  
Assume, for example, that the pool consisted of 100 not good 
drivers and only 10 good drivers.  The insurer must collect a 
total of $12,000 to cover this book of business.  Doing the 
same calculations as in Example #2 the good drivers would 
pay $87.27 per policy and the not good drivers would pay 
$111.29 (try your hand at the arithmetic).  This is a small 
increase for the 10 good drivers (an increase from $80.72 to 
$87.27), but a large benefit for the 100 not good drivers (a 
decrease from $302.80 to $111.29). 
Example #4 
Applying the regulation, the insurer must offer the good 
drivers a premium that is “at least 20 percent less than the 
lowest rate available to a comparable driver who is not a good 
driver.”  To accomplish this, the insurer must first solve for 
the not good driver rate, and then offer the good drivers .80 of 
that rate.  Assume the same numbers as in Example #1.  
Again, the total premium must equal $11,100.  Where x is the 
not good driver rate, the formula is: 10x + 100(.80x) = 
$11,100.  X (the not good driver rate) is $123.33.  The good 
driver rate must, then, be equal to or less than .80 x $123.33 
= $98.66.  This is a very large difference between what the 
Proposition suggests and what the regulation effects.  The 
good driver’s rate rises from $80 to $98.66 (only $3.34 below 
what they, arguably, “would otherwise have been charged”), 
while the not good driver’s rate falls from over $300 to the 
more palatable $123.33.  Indeed, since the GDD is a twenty 
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percent discount from the rate for not good drivers, the GDD 
becomes illusory if the rate for a not good driver exceeds the 
base rate by twenty percent or more. 
Example #5 
If the proportion of not good drivers in the relevant pool 
increases, the rates for both good drivers and not good drivers 
begin to fall.  Reverse the relative number of good and not 
good drivers to 10 good drivers and 100 not good drivers.  The 
rate for not good drivers falls to $111.11 and the rate for good 
drivers drops to $88.88.  Again, try your hand at the 
arithmetic. 193 
The results in Examples #4 and #5 show that the method 
of calculating the good driver discount is unfairly 
discriminatory.  The rates bear little relationship to “the 
expected value of all future costs associated with an 
individual risk transfer.”194  Even if one could articulate a 
principled basis for reducing good drivers’ rates to twenty 
percent less than they otherwise would be charged, there is 
no principled basis for allowing the rates for good and not 
good drivers, which we know should be $100 and $110 
respectively, substantially to vary merely because of the mix 
of good and not good drivers in the insurance company’s pool.  
The proportion of good and not good drivers is a matter 
entirely beyond the insured’s control and has no bearing on 
the insured’s individual risk. 
However one calculates the GDD, inserting into the pool 
large numbers of AVs entitled to the twenty percent discount 
will have important, and possibly unanticipated, 
consequences.  Since AVs should generate fewer liabilities for 
automobile insurers (both because they are safer and because 
possibly a significant number of the remaining losses may 
leapfrog over the automobile insurer directly to the supplier 




 193. 100x + 10(.80x) = $12,000.  X, the not good driver’s rate, equals $111.11.  
Eighty percent of the not good driver’s rate equals $88.88. 
 194. CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC., supra note 160. 
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Example #6 
Assume the same 110 car pool from above, but change 
the mix to: 
 
Good drivers –95 Per unit cost—100   Total cost  9,500 
Good drivers in AVs-5    Per unit cost—50 Total cost  250 
Not Good drivers-9 Per unit cost—110   Total cost  990 
Not Good drivers in 
AVs-1 
Per unit cost—50   Total cost  50 
 
Total premium needed to service this group—$10,790 
Since this is less than the $11,100 in Example #1, it 
stands to reason that individual premiums will be lower.  The 
average cost, or base rate, is $98.09 ($10,790/110).  Now 
calculate the GDD using the same formula as above: 10x + 
100(.80x) = $10,790.  The not good driver premium is $119.80 
and the good driver premium (.80 x $119.89) is $95.91.  Both 
are lower than the premium calculated above using the 
regulation. 
The five good drivers driving AVs and the one not good 
driver driving an AV, however, are paying far too much.  
Based on their risk, each should pay $50.  The not good AV 
driver’s premium is $119.89 and the good AV driver’s 
premium is $95.91. 
To make this fairer, one must create a rating class for AV 
drivers.  If they could be hived off from the other drivers, this 
would be easy.  Each would pay $50.  Since these are 
“automobile liability” policies within the meaning of 
California Insurance Code section 660(a), and since section 
660(a) is incorporated by Proposition 103,195 they must be 
rated with all other policies.  Consequently, the GDD must be 
extended to them, and the mandatory rating factors must also 
be applied to them.  As a consequence, AV drivers in general 
will pay too much, and AV drivers with poor driving records 
will  pay much too much. 
 
 
 195. INS. § 1861.02(a) (“Rates and premiums for an automobile insurance 
policy, as described in subdivision (a) of Section 660, shall be determined by 
application of the following factors in decreasing order of importance . . . .”). 
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F. Putting It All Together 
To calculate the premium for the AVs, the insurer must 
first calculate the GDD.  Again, assuming the group above 
and applying the regulations, the result is $95.91 for the 
“good” AV driver and $119.89 for the “not good” AV driver. 
The next step might be to create a rating plan for the 
class of AV drivers.  This, however, is not permitted by 
Proposition 103.  The insurer must first apply, in descending 
order of importance, the three mandatory rating factors 
imposed by Proposition 103.  Let us focus only on the first 
one—Driving Safety Record.  Since the AV is self-driven, the 
driving safety record should be irrelevant, as illustrated by 
the assumed $50 unit cost for both good and not good drivers 
of AVs in our hypothetical.  Nevertheless, driving safety 
record must be the most important of all the rating factors. 
The calculations are shown in Appendix A.196  In order to 
comply with Proposition 103 and the accompanying 
regulations, the “weight” attributed to driving safety record 
must be greater than the “weight” attributed to the fact that 
the car is an AV.  The weight attributed to driving safety 
record (remember, there are some bad drivers in ordinary 
cars among the group) is 3.96.  The weight attributable to 
AVs is 5.35.  This rate plan would be out of compliance; 
therefore, the insurer must either “pump” the driving safety 
record-rating factor by artificially expanding its relativities or 
“temper” the AV rating factor by artificially compressing its 
relativities, or both.  When one rating factor is pumped, then 
another must be tempered in order that the total premium 
collected equals the $10,790 original total premium covering 
all losses and related costs. 
Appendix A shows the calculations assuming tempering 
(col. 9) or pumping (col. 10).  The tempered weight for AVs in 
col. (18) is a fraction below (at the 14th decimal place!) the 
 
 196. The author is extremely grateful to Shawna Ackerman for her 
invaluable assistance in developing this example.  Ms. Ackerman is an actuary 
who has worked for the California Department of Insurance, for Pinnacle 
Actuarial Resources, Inc., and now works for the California Earthquake 
Authority.  An electronic copy of this paper can be found at  
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/337/.  The formulae for the 
calculations are imbedded in the Excel spread sheet noted in the Appendix to 
this Article and can be manipulated by the user after the Appendix is 
downloaded. 
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3.96 weight for driving record in col. (8), so it is now in 
compliance.  In neither case does the AV insured pay the 
appropriate amount.  In one case the good AV driver pays 
$60.44 and the not good AV driver pays $75.55—both well 
over the $50 represented by their risk.  The excess premium 
returns to the pool and subsidizes non-AV drivers.  In the 
pumping example, the five good AV drivers pay $47.63 (only a 
discount of $2.37 below the $50 risk) and the one not good AV 
driver pays $63.17 ($13.17 too much).  A small subsidy of 
$1.32 [$13.17 – 5($2.37)] flows back to the premium pool to 
subsidize other drivers.  Note, too, that the good AV driver’s 
premium is, as it must be, equal to or less than eighty percent 
of the not good AV driver’s premium, even though both 
present the same unit cost ($50 per car) and in one example, 
the good AV driver, even with the GDD, pays $10.44 more 
than the $50 unit cost of the risk.   
Keep in mind that this calculation relates only to the 
driving record rating factor.  At its highest permissible 
weight, the rating of AVs must weigh less than the third 
rating factor (years of driving experience—likely of little 
relevance for self-driving cars), thus pushing it even further 
from its true weight.  Therefore, the best position AVs can 
enjoy in this ratings race is fourth place. 
One may argue that raising the premium for a not good 
driver of a self-driving car makes as much sense as raising 
the price of bus or train tickets for not good drivers.  
Awarding a GDD that results in a premium of $10.44 more 
than the risk makes little sense.  It is difficult to imagine any 
social policy supporting this discrimination. 
Perhaps there is a way out of this dilemma.  One might 
argue that an owner of an AV is not a “person who qualifies” 
under the Proposition because the GDD is a discount earned 
by good driving.  Perhaps it is arguable that a person who 
does not drive is not a “driver,” therefore cannot be a “good 
driver.”  This interpretation, though sensible, would require 
some stretching of the Proposition’s language and would 
probably invite a court challenge. 
Commercial insurers of manufacturers and suppliers are 
not encumbered with Proposition 103’s unique automobile 
provisions,197 therefore they need not offer a GDD, nor need 
 
 197. The automobile provisions of Proposition 103 only apply to automobile 
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they conform to the ranking of the mandatory rating factors.  
To the extent that the risks of AVs are transferred to them, 
the insurance burden passed to consumers in the price of the 
car can reflect the actual, and presumably lower, risk 
presented by AVs.  As noted above, however, for practical 
reasons some rating factors, such as annual miles driven and 
territory, cannot properly be reflected in the automobile price.  
Moving from the awkward and arbitrary results mandated by 
Proposition 103’s rating factors to a commercial insurance 
setting that cannot properly reflect some other rating factors 
is also an awkward trade-off.  At best, it may be a choice of 
the least worst.198 
Another viable solution might to be to amend the 
California Insurance Code section 660(a) to exclude from the 
definition of “policy” those policies covering liability for AVs 
(at least when operated in autonomous mode).  Since 
Proposition 103 incorporates section 660(a), this would likely 
require a two-thirds vote of the legislature and the 
amendment would have to “further the purposes” of 
Proposition 103.  Assuming a two-thirds vote could be 
mustered, the issue would then be whether the amendment 
furthers the purposes of the Proposition.  To the extent that 
liability moves from fault-based driving to defect-based 
products liability, the purposes underlying the mandatory 
rating factors and the GDD simply cannot be accomplished.  
Manufacturers will pass these costs through to automobile 
buyers free of the Proposition’s restraints.  Since the purposes 
of the Proposition, at least with respect to liability 
coverage,199 simply cannot be accomplished when dealing with 
self-driving cars, amending section 660(a) would not frustrate 
the purposes of Proposition 103.  “Furthering” may be 
different from “not frustrating,” but avoiding forcing 
 
liability, physical damage or collisions policies. INS. § 1861.02(a); CAL. INS. 
CODE  § 660(a) (West 2011).  Since the automobile provisions of Proposition 103 
do not apply to commercial policies, manufacturers need not pump, temper or 
offer a good driver discount. 
 198. As King Lear lamented when forced to choose, so he thought, between 
evil daughter Goneril and very evil daughter Regan, “Not being the worst 
stands in some rank of praise.”  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR art II, sc. iv 
(W. Cross and T. Brooke, ed., Yale Univ. 1993). 
 199. There still may be some role for comprehensive, collision and MedPay 
coverage, at least to the extent that these offer coverages unattached to any 
fault on the part of the insured or defect on the part of the insured automobile. 
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Proposition 103 into a mold that does not fit its purposes 
could be viewed as furthering its purposes.  It is also unlikely 
that the voters considered insurance rules governing 
automobiles that, at the time they adopted Proposition 103, 
existed only in fantasy.  If the Department of Insurance were 
to sponsor the legislation, one might expect the sponsorship 
to be afforded some level of deference.200 
Jurisdictions not governed by Proposition 103 would find 
it relatively easy to deal with this advancing technology.  
Proposition 103, and the difficulties faced with amending it, 
may leave California at a decided disadvantage when it comes 
to coping with this developing technology. 
IV. ADJUSTING RATES TO REFLECT RAPIDLY IMPROVING 
TECHNOLOGY 
Technology improves at an astounding rate.  Gordon 
Moore, a past president of Intel, famously (and thus far 
accurately) predicted that transistor count on microprocessors 
would grow exponentially—doubling every two years.201  This 
has become known as “Moore’s Law.”  His colleague at Intel, 
David House, predicted that this would cause computer 
performance to double every eighteen months.202  Perhaps 
this should be known as “House’s Corollary.”  Whether or not 
these predictions directly bear on AVs, one can expect rapid 
developments in the technology controlling them.  Thus, the 
risks they present may dramatically change with the latest 
download, update or patch.  So, too, the appropriate rate for 
the risk should change—likely downward.  Proposition 103 
makes it difficult to produce timely rates that are reasonably 
responsive to changes in loss exposures. 
 
 200. See Found. for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights v. Garamendi, 132 Cal. 
App. 4th 1354, 1373 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Great weight should be given to an 
agency's construction of a rule or regulation it enforces.”). 
 201. Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, 
38 PROC. OF THE IEEE 1, available at ftp://download.intel.com/ 
museum/Moores_Law/Articles-Press_Releases/Gordon_Moore_1965_Article.pdf.  
The increase in the number of transistors on a microprocessor looks roughly like 
this:  1971—2300, 1985—275,000, 2000—42 million, 2004—592 million, 2011—
3 billion.  Steven Johnson, More & More of Moore’s Law, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Dec. 5, 2011, at C1. 
 202. INTEL, VIDEO TRANSCRIPT: EXCERPT FROM A CONVERSATION WITH 
GORDON MOORE: MOORE’S LAW (2005), ftp://download.intel.com/ 
museum/Moores_Law/Video-Transcripts/Excepts_A_Conversation_with_Gordon 
_Moore.pdf. 
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Automobile manufacturers and sellers may adjust their 
prices according to the market.  Proposition 103, however, 
provides, in effect, that those who sell automobile insurance 
must charge the full sticker price.203  Proposition 103 also 
provides that “[e]very insurer which desires to change any 
rate shall file a complete rate application with the 
commissioner.”204  While this may, on its face, seem a neutral 
provision, its practical impact is contrary to the interests of 
consumers.  Like other businesses, insurance is somewhat 
cyclical.  There are “hard markets” in which supply is 
restricted and one might expect rates to rise.  There are “soft 
markets” where insurance is more available or demand is 
lower, thus one might expect rates to fall.  This provision, as 
currently interpreted, applies even when an insurer wants to 
lower rates.  Lower rates, of course, benefit consumers. 
 While voters who adopted Proposition 103 may well have  
had in mind keeping rates at the lowest rate at which an 
insurer will be willing to bring a product to the market, it 
seems unlikely that the voters intended to increase 
impediments to lowering rates—at least not when lowering 
rates would not threaten the solvency of the insurer. 
Filing a “complete rate application with the 
commissioner” is a substantial impediment to reducing rates.  
A complete rate application is an expensive, ponderous and 
time-consuming process.  A typical filing may take three to 
five months before approval.  Some applications have even 
been delayed for a year.205  In 2009, when insurers filed many 
new rate plans in order to comply with the new territorial 
rating regulations, delays among the top twenty private 
passenger auto insurers ranged from a low of 54 days (Viking) 
to a high of 558 days (USAA and USAA Casualty).  Many 
took over 300 days (e.g., State Farm Mutual, Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, Progressive Choice).206  If the desire to 
lower rates is in response to a “soft market,” by the time the 
lower rate has been approved, the market may have 
significantly altered.  Thus, it removes, to the detriment of 
 
 203. See MacKay v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1427, 1440–41 (Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 204. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(b) (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
 205. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE (July 28, 2009), 
http://insurance.ca.gov/. 
 206. Id. 
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consumers, one motive to lower rates in a soft market.  In 
addition, once an application to lower rates is filed, the 
Commissioner, consumer groups, and others can intervene 
and ask that the rates be lowered even further.207  Thus, an 
application to lower a rate by six percent may invite pressure 
to lower it even further.208  If they “substantially contributed, 
as a whole” to the decision, a consumer group can also bill the 
insurance company for its legal, advocacy, and witness fees.209 
Unless otherwise required by the Commissioner of 
Insurance, an insurer may normally expect a rate, once 
approved, to remain valid for three years.210  Given the 
disincentives to lowering rates outlined above, one may 
expect that an insurer who wants to lower its rates to 
compete for greater market share in a softening market may 
temporize until otherwise required to make a new rate 
application.211  This is especially so because, even if the 
insurer successfully completes a rate application to lower its 
rates, if market conditions harden during this three year 
period, there is no assurance, without going through the 
entire process again, that the insurer can return its rates to 
the previously approved rates. 
 
 
 207. INS. § 1861.05(c). 
 208. For example, GEICO General filed to lower rates by 9.70%.  On July 5, 
2007, the Department approved a rate reduction of 14.50%, - 4.80% lower than 
requested.  This is not to suggest that the lower rate is not justified, but just to 
illustrate that applications to lower rates come with some risk to the insurer.  
There are numerous other examples on the Department’s web site.  State Farm 
Mutual filed to lower its rates by 3.20%, but the approved rate on April 5, 2009 
was -8.00%—a difference of -4.80%.  Infinity Insurance filed to lower rates by 
2.79%, but the approved rate on 7/22/09 was -10.44%—a difference of -7.65%.  
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, supra note 205. 
 209. INS. § 1861.10(b). 
The commissioner or a court shall award reasonable advocacy and 
witness fees and expenses to any person who demonstrates that (1) the 
person represents the interests of consumers, and, (2) that he or she 
has made a substantial contribution to the adoption of any order, 
regulation or decision by the commissioner or a court. Where such 
advocacy occurs in response to a rate application, the award shall be 
paid by the applicant. 
Id.; see also CAL. CODE  REGS. tit. 10, § 2661.1(k) (2008). 
 210. Tit. 10, § 2644.50.  Many insurers, however, file rate plans more 
frequently.  Yearly filings are not uncommon. 
 211. Indeed, it may be that some of the longer rate processing times noted 
above may have been in part a result of temporizing by insurers who, during the 
process, were applying what they thought were favorable rates. 
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Experience elsewhere suggests that this disincentive to 
lowering rates, with respect to personal automobile 
insurance, is unnecessary.  Relying primarily on competition 
to regulate automobile rates, there are numerous file-and-use 
or use-and-file states.  These all allow insurer’s to lower rates 
(or raise them for that matter) without prior approval—
usually subject to the regulator’s ability to disapprove a rate 
based on inadequacy, excessiveness, or unfair 
discrimination.212  Even among the states that generally 
apply “prior approval” to private auto, many permit insurers 
to lower rates below the approved rate.213  This is usually 
accomplished by moving the process from prior approval to 
either file-and-use or use-and-file if the change (often up or 
down) falls within a prescribed percentage.  The percentage 
ranges from a high of 25% (Kentucky) to 10% (Alabama, 
Pennsylvania), 7% (South Carolina and possibly New Jersey), 
5% (New York) and “less than 5%” (North Dakota).214 
There does not appear to be any indication that 
facilitating the lowering of rates has impaired the solvency of 
insurers.215  The benefits of lower rates to consumers are 
obvious.  States that show a concern for solvency modulate 
the impact by designating a range between five and ten 
percent.216  Others simply rely on the regulator’s ability to 
disapprove a filed or used rate.  California consumers would 
 
 212. For examples see Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia (rate decreases for auto), 
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky (if rate change is not over twenty-five percent in last 
twelve months), Louisiana, Maryland, Maine, Mississippi, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey (only if decrease is revenue neutral), 
New Mexico, New York (for rate decreases only), North Dakota (if less than five 
percent), Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania (decreases of ten percent or 
less), Rhode Island (unless decrease exceeds five percent), South Carolina (up to 
seven percent below company’s existing rate), South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Regulation Modernization,  supra note 34. 
 213. See id. 
 214. For examples, see Alabama (ten percent or less), Georgia (rate decreases 
for all lines except large commercial risks), Kentucky (decreases of more than 
twenty-five percent within twelve months), New Jersey (increases of seven 
percent, unclear about decreases), New York (as of 2010, flex rating up or down 
within five percent band in any twelve month period), North Dakota (if less 
than five percent), Pennsylvania (decreases of ten percent or less), and South 
Carolina (decrease of up to seven percent).  The essential elements of various 
state regulations are listed online.  See id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05 (West 2011). 
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benefit from a similar approach. 
While insurers must charge the rate approved by the 
Commissioner, that a “rate” has been approved should be no 
impediment to charging a lower rate.  It seems reasonable 
that a rate of $100 includes the lower rate of $95.217  Thus, 
insurers should be allowed to flex down without doing 
violence to the words or purpose of Proposition 103.  New 
York, a prior approval state, is probably the most recent state 
to move in this direction.  Effective January 2010, auto 
insurers may flex up or down within a five percent band in 
any twelve-month period without seeking prior approval.218 
Ability to lower rates will be even more important as the 
safety of AVs evolves.  Predicting loss trends for one, two or 
three years into the future is difficult at best.  Marketing 
insurance is much like trading in futures.  Money is collected 
now against a promise to deliver a service later at an 
unknown cost.  The analogy may be even more apt than 
appears.  Following the oil crisis of 1979–1980 claims 
frequency dropped.  Drivers were not driving more safely; 
they were simply driving less because fuel prices had 
spiked.219  Where rapidly advancing technology pushes down 
the risk presented by AVs, the regulatory environment should 
be nimble enough to allow consumers to benefit with equal 
promptness. 
As in other states, solvency concerns can be addressed by 
bounding the flex range within reasonable limits.  Proposition 
103 provides that the commissioner must hold a hearing if 
requested to do so and a rate adjustment for auto insurance 
exceeds seven percent.220  This number seems a fair average 
for those many states that allow flex down (and usually up) 
without prior approval.  If claims experience for AVs were to 
drop dramatically within the time frame in which an insurer 
might reasonably be expected to file a new rate plan, seven 
percent may prove too conservative a parameter. 
 
 217. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3536 (2011) (“The greater contains the less.”). 
 218. See Regulation Modernization, supra note 34. 
 219. LeRoy Boison, Will Post-Katrina Gas Shortages Impact Auto Claim 
Frequencies? PINNACLE ACTUARIES, Dec. 2005, at 1, available at 
http://www.pinnacleactuaries.com/Files/Publications/mon-PinnacleMonograph 
2005GasShortages.pdf. 
 220. INS. § 1861.05(c) (“[T]he proposed rate adjustment exceeds 7% of the 
then applicable rate for personal lines or 15% for commercial lines, in which 
case the commissioner must hold a hearing upon a timely request.”). 
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There may be some concern that an insurer might flex 
down in an unfairly discriminatory way.  This concern, if 
valid, may be addressed by requiring the insurer to flex down 
equally across all classes within the class plan.  If 
improvements among the pool of AVs lower claims 
experience, lowering rates across the board is an awkward 
compromise.  Unless rates may be lowered only for AVs, all 
insureds, whether driving AVs or more dangerous 
automobiles, will benefit from the lower rates attributed to 
improvements brought to the pool only by AVs.  It should also 
be kept in mind that the Commissioner has the power to halt 
any rate change by holding a hearing on the Commissioner’s 
own motion.221  Virtually every state forbids rates that are 
unfairly discriminatory, but this has not been an impediment 
to states with the flexibility noted above. 
In order to credit savings to the AV owners who have 
earned them, it might be helpful to think of an AV that has 
been upgraded with a download as a vehicle different from 
the one that was originally rated.  If a policyholder changes 
automobiles mid-term, or changes the use of an automobile 
(e.g., a change from commuting to pleasure), the insurer 
immediately adjusts the policyholder’s rates.  The 
adjustment, however, will be to a rate already pre-approved 
in the insurer’s class plan.  If, however, an insured purchases 
a new model that did not exist at the time of the previous rate 
filing, the insurer need not submit a new rate filing to rate 
the car.  The new model is simply accounted for in the next 
rate filing.  It may be helpful, then, to think of each 
significant upgrade to self-driving cars as analogous to a new 
model. 
Anticipating rapid advances based on experience and 
technology, it might also be possible to pre-approve rate 
adjustments based on verifiable improvements.  To insure the 
integrity of the suggested rate changes, perhaps some 
independent certification of the efficacy of the change might 
be required.  The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), Department of Transportation 
(DOT), or some other body may be an appropriate certifier. 
Even if cost savings are clearly attributable to 
improvements in AVs, crediting them to AV policyholders 
 
 221. Id. 
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may be difficult for another reason.  Again, the mandatory 
rating factors impose their restraints.  If rates fall for the 
“type of vehicle” rating factor, the factor’s weight may, then, 
exceed the weight of the third mandatory factor—years of 
driving experience.  The insurer would, then, be out of 
compliance. 
As noted above, to the extent the liability and insurance 
burden passes to manufacturers and their insurers, rates 
may be adjusted outside the restraints of Proposition 103.  
Because the liability and/or insurance costs were passed on to 
the buyer in the cost of the car, it would be difficult to pass 
savings onto current owners after the sale was completed.  
Only new buyers would benefit from insurance savings 
attributable to more recent technological improvements. 
It may be that the Commissioner could adopt a definition 
of “rate” that is broad enough or flexible enough to 
accommodate this new technology.  Alternatively, the 
Commissioner could sponsor legislation to authorize “flex 
down.”  If the legislation were viewed as a modification of 
Proposition 103, it would require the two-thirds super 
majority noted above.  It is at least arguable that lowering 
rates in a non-discriminatory way and consistent with 
maintaining solvency furthers the purposes of the 
Proposition. 
CONCLUSION 
California is the cradle of technological innovation.  Not 
surprisingly, Google, one of the primary developers of AVs, is 
located in California. 
California is not the cradle of insurance innovation.  
Despite Woody Allen’s 1973 film, Sleeper, the drafters of 
Proposition 103, and the voters convinced to follow their lead, 
embedded in California a regulatory system ill-suited to 
insuring self-driving automobiles that are controlled by new 
and fast developing technology.222 
Unless ways can be found to conform Proposition 103 to 
this new reality, insurance for AVs is likely to migrate to a 
statutory and regulatory environment untrammeled by 
Proposition 103—commercial policies carried by 
manufacturers and suppliers.  This migration presents its 
 
 222. See SLEEPER, supra note 6. 
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own set of problems.  While the safety of AVs could be more 
fairly rated, other important rating factors, such as annual 
miles driven and territory, must be compromised.  Whether 
this migration occurs will also depend on how liability rules 
do or do not adjust to a world in which people will 
nevertheless suffer injuries from AVs, but in which it is 
unlikely our present fault rules will adequately address 
compensation. 
If concepts of non-delegable duty, agency, or strict 
liability attach initial liability to owners of faulty cars with 
faultless drivers, the insurance burden will first be filtered 
through automobile insurance governed by Proposition 103.  
These insurers will then pass the losses up the distribution 
line to the insurers of suppliers and manufacturers that are 
not governed by Proposition 103.  Manufacturers and 
suppliers will then pass the insurance cost back to AV owners 
in the cost of the vehicle.  The insurance load reflected in the 
price of the car will pass through to automobile owners free of 
any of the restrictions imposed by Proposition 103.  There will 
be no GDD, such as it is, no mandatory rating factors, and, 
depending on where the suppliers’ or manufacturers’ insurers 
are located, more flexible rating.  One may ask: What is 
gained by this merry-go-round? 
When addressing the insurance challenges of AVs, 
perhaps the regulatory system needs someone with the vision 
of the late Steve Jobs.  In the age of the MacBook Pro, 
developers of AVs may find themselves working in a legal and 
regulatory environment (the Operating System, if you will) 
somewhat akin to the 1985 Mac. 
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APPENDIX A 
Example with Self-Driving Cars (SDC)223 
 
 
 223. See http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/337/ to access the excel 
spreadsheet. 
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